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Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation
and the Art of Defensive Self-Help
PETER RE1LLY*
"Truth is such a precious quantity, it should be usedsparingly."
Mark Twain
I. INTRODUCTION
Niccol6 Machiavelli,1 who enthusiastically endorsed the art of deception,
wrote in The Prince nearly five hundred years ago, "[Y]ou must be a great
liar.., a deceitful man will always find plenty who are ready to be
deceived."' 2 Was Machiavelli right? Can honing one's ability to lie be
advantageous in certain situations? Moreover, are there great liars among us
who are willing and able to prey upon the so-called "sucker born every
minute"? 3 Finally, if such liars exist, to what extent has the rest of society
* Associate Professor, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law
School; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; A.B., Princeton University.
Georgetown-Hewlett Fellow in Conflict Resolution and Legal Problem-Solving,
Georgetown University Law Center, 2002-2005. I am most grateful for the helpful
comments I received from Kelly Anders, Scott Burnham, Kondi Kleinman, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Nancy Rapoport, Rob Rhee, Keith Rowley, Matt Runkel, Andrea
Schneider, Jeff Stempel, and Jean Stemlight. I also wish to thank Diana Gleason and
Jeanne Price for their excellent assistance in the library, and Jill Levickas and Katie
Weber for their excellent research assistance. Of course, all errors are my own.
INiccol6 Machiavelli (1469-1527) was an Italian diplomat, political philosopher,
musician, poet, and playwright. A figure of the Italian Renaissance, Machiavelli is
perhaps best known for his treatise on realist political theory. See NIccOL6
MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Robert M. Adams trans., W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
1977) (1532); see also STUDIES IN MACHIAVELLIANISM (Richard Christie & Florence L.

Geis eds., Academic Press Inc. 1970) (discussing studies indicating that people who
demonstrate strength in a personality variable called "Machiavellianism" are more likely
to lie when they need to do so, better able to tell lies without feeling anxious, and more
persuasive and effective in their lies).
2 MACHIAVELLI, supranote 1, at 50.

3Although the well-known phrase is often attributed to American showman P.T.
Barnum, at least one source attributes it to the famous confidence man Joseph "Paper
Collar Joe" Bessimer. See A. H. SAXON, P.T. BARNUM: THE LEGEND AND THE MAN 336-

37 (2d ed. 1989). For an excellent discussion of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and others placed into context within the Modem Age of
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been trained in the art of defensive self-help, or the mindsets, strategies, and
tactics necessary to protect themselves from exploitation?
I wrote this article to advance a dialogue and debate surrounding a new
way to address the thorny and seemingly intractable problem of lying in the
context of negotiation. 4 Specifically, although a good deal of ink has been
spilled in past law review articles focusing on the offending parties (the liars
and deceivers) and how various rules and laws might be altered to control
their behavior, 5 in this article I turn the spotlight on the defending parties
(those being lied to and deceived) and ways they can shield themselves from
such predatory behaviors.
The majority of law review articles written regarding ethical issues
surrounding lying and deception in negotiation have argued, in one form or
another, that liars and deceivers could be successfully reined in and
controlled if only the applicable ethics rules were strengthened, and if
corresponding enforcement mechanisms and powers were sufficiently
beefed-up and effectively executed. This article, however, argues that the
applicable ethics rules will likely never be strengthened, and, furthermore,
that even if they were, they would be difficult to enforce in any meaningful
way, at least in the context of negotiation.
The logical conclusion to these arguments is that lawyers, business
people, and everyone else who engages in negotiation must learn how to
carefully and purposefully implement strategies and behaviors to defend
themselves against those who lie and deceive-no matter the reasons
prompting it. I therefore conclude the article by offering prescriptive advice
(including examples) for minimizing one's risk of being exploited in a
Western political philosophy, see BAILEY KUKLN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS
OF THE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 47-72 (1994).
4 Polanyi wrote:
In an ideal free society each person would have perfect access to the truth:
to the truth in science, in art, religion and justice, both in public and
private life. But this is not practicable; each person can know directly very
little of truth and must trust others for the rest. Indeed, to assure this

process of mutual reliance is one of the main functions of society.
MICHAEL POLANYI, THE STUDY OF MAN 68 (1958).

5 See, e.g., Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality,
39 VAND. L. REv. 1387 (1986); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577 (1975); Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the
Forum: A Proposalfor Process-EnablingEthical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
1 (2005); Ruth Fleet Thurman, Chipping Away at Lawyer Veracity: The ABA 's Turn
Toward Situation Ethics in Negotiations, 1990 J. DISP. RESOL. 103 (1990); Geoffrey M.
Peters, The Use ofLies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Peters, Use
ofLies].
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negotiation should other parties lie. The advice is undergirded by the notion,
expressed throughout the article, that information exchange (or lack thereof)
plays a pivotal role in all negotiations. Indeed, I argue that information is the
lifeblood of any negotiation, and therefore that the various strategies and
behaviors influencing whether, when, and how information is obtained
and/or exchanged are extremely important in the process of defending
oneself (or one's client) against lying and deception.
The article is divided into six Parts. In Part II, I discuss the role that
negotiation plays, and that lying plays, in law and in wider contexts. I also
describe the kinds of issues people tend to lie about when they negotiate. Part
III analyzes incentives people have to lie in certain kinds of negotiations, as
well as possible antidotes to lying within specific hypothetical scenarios. Part
IV analyzes the law of truthfulness, from duties of disclosure, to
requirements of "good faith" that are just starting to gain a foothold in the
context of negotiation, to the long-accepted practice of "puffing." Part V
reports the outcome of a survey illustrating the disagreement and confusion
that appears to exist among lawyers regarding standards of truthfulness in the
law. Part VI analyzes why raising the ethical bar, or why strengthening the
duty of candor as currently set forth in rules of professional conduct for
lawyers, would likely fail. Part VII offers prescriptive advice for minimizing
the risk of exploitation during negotiation by setting forth mindsets,
strategies, and techniques that both lawyers and nonlawyers can draw upon
when confronting liars and deceivers. Although this article is targeted to legal
academics, practicing lawyers, and the wider legal community, the
suggestions I offer are equally applicable to negotiations taking place in
almost any field, occupation, or circumstance.
II. LYING INNEGOTIATION: BUILDING A CONTEXT
A. The Normalcy of Lying
People lie. As one scholar of deception notes, "Lying is not exceptional;
it is normal, and more often spontaneous and unconscious than cynical and
coldly analytical. Our minds and bodies secrete deceit."'6 Moreover, lawyers

6 DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH,

WHY WE LIE: THE EVOLUTIONARY ROOTS OF

DECEPTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND 15 (2004); see also SISSELA BOK, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE xvii (1978) [hereinafter BOK, LYING]
(suggesting that "[iln law and in journalism, in government and in the social sciences,
deception is taken for granted when it is felt to be excusable by those who tell the lies and
who tend also to make the rules.").
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lie, 7 especially in negotiations. 8 One legal scholar concludes that lying is "not
the province of a few 'unethical lawyers' who operate on the margins of the
profession. It is a permanent feature of advocacy and thus of almost the
entire province of law." 9 And business people lie: one business ethics scholar
concludes simply, "Commercial negotiations seem to require a talent for
deception."' 0 This statement is easy to believe in light of corporate scandals

7 Negotiations Professor Charles Craver is fond of starting negotiation workshops
with the candid statement: "I've never been involved in legal negotiations where both
sides didn't lie." DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICs 470 (5th ed.
2004); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality andProfessionalResponsibility
in Negotiation, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 119, 126
(Phyllis Bernard & Bryant Garth eds., 2002) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics,

Morality] (pointing out that many professions exhibit "role-based exceptions" to the
general commandment against lying and deception, for example, "doctors deceive or lie
to protect their clients' health or confidentiality; journalists, police officers and social
scientists use deception to learn the 'truth' and protect their sources; and public officials
lie to protect national security, as well as to get elected by large, diverse and contentious
constituencies.").
8 Affirmative misrepresentations by lawyers in negotiation have been the basis for:
(1) litigation sanctions (see, e.g., Sheppard v. River Valley Fitness One, L.P., 428 F.3d 1,
11 (1st Cir. 2005)); (2) setting aside settlement agreements (see, e.g., Virzi v. Grand
Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507, 512 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (setting
aside settlement agreement because lawyer failed to disclose death of client prior to
settlement)); and (3) civil lawsuits against lawyers themselves (see, e.g., Jeska v. Mulhall,
693 P.2d 1335, 1338-39 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (sustaining fraudulent misrepresentation
claim by buyer of real estate against seller's lawyer for misrepresentations made during
negotiations)).
9 Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219,
1272 (1990). Moreover, lying is not limited to the province of "advocacy" within law-it
also occurs in more cooperative realms, like mediation. Professional mediator Robert
Benjamin defines "noble lies" as those told by mediators that are "designed to shift and
reconfigure the thinking of disputing parties, especially in the midst of conflict and
confusion, and to foster and further their cooperation, tolerance, and survival ....
"
Robert D. Benjamin, The Constructive Uses of Deception: Skills, Strategies, and
Techniques of the Folkloric Trickster Figure and Their Application by Mediators, 13
MEDIATION Q. 3, 17 (1995); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting
Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 89 (1999)
("Instructions to tell the 'whole truth' notwithstanding, it is generally not considered
perjury in a trial or deposition for a witness to give a technically true but evasive
answer.").
10 G. Richard Shell, When Is It Legal to Lie in Negotiations?,32 SLOAN MGT. REV.
93, 93 (1991); see also William H. Widen, Lord ofthe Liens: Towards GreaterEfficiency
in Secured SyndicatedLending, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1577, 1600 n.76 (arguing that lying
in business is "widespread" in American society). Others have made similar observations:
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such as Enron, 11 Tyco, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Qwest, Adelphia
Communications, and, more recently, the arrest of two former Bear Steams
executives for fraud 12 as well as the arrest of over four hundred (and
counting) real estate professionals in a nationwide Justice Department
investigation dubbed "Operation Malicious Mortgage."' 13
Nearly twenty years ago, one legal scholar noted that, "Thus far, efforts
to improve bargaining ethics have been an empty vessel. '14 Despite prolific
and insightful scholarship on the subject, 15 the same statement could be made

Most executives from time to time are almost compelled, in the interests of
their companies or themselves, to practice some form of deception when negotiating
with customers, dealers, labor unions, government officials, or even other
departments of their companies. By conscious misstatements, concealment of
pertinent facts, or exaggeration-in short, by bluffing-they seek to persuade others
to agree with them.
Albert Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A
PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 69, 70-71 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane eds.,
3d ed. 1988).
11 See Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1373, 1394-95 (2003) ("[T]he collapse [of Enron] was caused by humans and their

hubris. We need to ensure that hubris doesn't blind us to the first rule of leadership: It's
all about character."); Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002
Style, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the governance failures of a number of

companies, including Tyco, Global Crossing, and Qwest); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What
Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation:
Some InitialReflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002) (discussing future implications

of Enron).
12 The two men, Ralph R. Cioffi and Matthew M. Tannin, were the first senior
executives from Wall Street investment banks to face criminal charges stemming from
the U.S. economy's still-unfolding credit difficulties. Charging the men with nine counts
of securities, mail, and wire fraud, Mark J. Mershon, director of the FBI's New York
Office, stated at a press conference: "This is not about mismanagement of a hedge fund
investment strategy ... It is about premeditatedlies to investors and lenders." Landon
Thomas, Jr., 2 FaceFraud Chargesin Bear Stearns Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008,

at Al (emphasis added).
13 Beginning in March, 2008, the Justice Department has charged 406 people
nationwide with mortgage fraud. Sam Zuckerman, Mortgage Mess Leads to Arrests; 2
Wall Street Execs Indicted and Cuffed-FederalFraudSweep Tops 400 Defendants, S.F.
CHRON., June 20, 2008, at Al.
14
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargainingand the Ethic ofProcess, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.

493, 577 (1989).
15

See, e.g., WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS (Carrie Menkel-Meadow &
Michael Wheeler eds., 2004); Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' BargainingEthics, Contract,
and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional
Pluralism, 90 IOwA L. REV. 475 (2005) [hereinafter Peppet, Bargaining Ethics];
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today. And though efforts will likely be made to improve bargaining ethics
during the next twenty years, this article puts forth recommendations for
action-specifically, the use of defensive mindsets, strategies, and tacticsthat can be implemented starting today, by lawyers, business people, and
anyone else who might be confronted with lies and deception in the context
of negotiation.16
During the last two decades, there have been numerous calls from legal
academia to strengthen the ethics rules governing bargaining for lawyers, yet
little to none have prevailed.17 Professor Scott Peppet states, "The minimalist
way in which we currently regulate bargaining is one of the most powerful
expressions of the profession's conception of the lawyer as adversarial
CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (5th ed. 2005);
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN
DEALS AND DISPUTE (2000); DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE,
supra note 7; ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING To YES:

NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. Penguin Books 1991) (1981);
Jonathan R. Cohen, When People are the Means: Negotiating with Respect, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2001); Douglas H. Yam, Lawyer Ethics in ADR and the
Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Considerationsfor Adoption and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207 (2001); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from
the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997);
Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics
for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving:
Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935 (2001); Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and
Collaborative Lawyering." Why Put Old Hats on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 505 (2003).
16 Some scholars have drawn a distinction between negotiations involving the
resolution of legal disputes and negotiations in the context of business transactions. See,
e.g., Hilary D. Wells, Raising the Bar in Settlement Negotiations: A Rationale for
Amending Arizona's Rules of Professional Conduct, 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1261, 1268 (2001)
("Arguably, when trial is the ultimate forum for resolving a failed negotiation, practices
acceptable in settlement negotiations should more closely emulate courtroom practices
than business conventions."). Other scholars suggest the distinction is not particularly
meaningful: "Although negotiations may be categorized as aimed at either settling legal
disputes or trying to consummate deals, these two categories of negotiations would
collapse into a single type were it not for the availability of a court to which parties could
resort upon failure of negotiations concerning a legal dispute." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties, 33
S.C. L. REV. 181, 188 (1981).
17 See Wells, supra note 16, at 1276-77 (in discussing the unanswered call to the bar
for definitive guidance regarding lawyer conduct in negotiations, the author concludes
that, despite revisions put forth by two separate ABA ethics reform committees, truthtelling requirements in negotiation "will remain hopelessly ineffective unless substantive
revisions are undertaken.").
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advocate. To reform bargaining ethics is to end the profession as we know
it."' 18 However, I would suggest that Professor Peppet's statement gives too
much credence to the power of rules and laws in shaping behavior with
respect to lying in negotiation. After all, such rules and guidelines can
influence people's behavior only to the extent that they feel they might
realistically get caught and ultimately pay a price through the court and penal
systems or through a professional disciplinary body. Moreover, there are
other potentially powerful factors influencing lying in negotiation, such as
one's internal morality (including the "mirror" test, or "how do I appear to
20
myself at the end of the day?") 19 and one's reputational interests.

18 Peppet, BargainingEthics, supra note 15, at 480; see also Patrick J. Schiltz, On
Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical
Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871, 909 (1999) ("[Tlhe formal [ethics] rules represent

nothing more than 'the lowest common denominator of conduct that a highly selfinterested group will tolerate."' (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, InstitutionalizingEthics, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 730 (1994)). Also:
'Thinking like a lawyer' does not refer to lawyers pondering how they can
assure that their clients obey the law. Rather, it generally means that lawyers
strategize how they can accomplish their clients' objectives to the greatest extent
possible without running afoul of the law. This approach to advocacy is embodied in
the ethical rules and legal culture in the U.S.
Christopher M. Fairman, Why We Still Need a Model Rule for CollaborativeLaw: A
Reply to ProfessorLande, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 707, 709 (2007) (quoting John
Lande, Principlesfor PolicymakingAbout CollaborativeLaw and Other ADR Processes,

22 OiO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 642,646 (2007)).
19 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What's Fair in Negotiation? What is Ethics in
Negotiation?,in WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 15, at xv.
20 See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality, supra note 7, at 123 (pointing out that

lawyers must be wary of reputational implications because what they say is now
witnessed by growing numbers of participants in various ADR processes, including the
third-party neutrals like mediators and arbitrators, as well as judges, opponents, and other
parties); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 509, 525-

27, 561-64 (1994) (recommending that professional groups catering to lawyers create
mechanisms to facilitate the building and dissemination of attorney reputations); Peter C.
Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, PromotingHonesty in Negotiation:An Exercise in Practical
Ethics, in WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 15, at 119 (discussing

how a "negotiator with a reputation for being deceitful is likely to be disadvantaged in
future negotiations."); Holmes Norton, supra note 14, at 501 (arguing that a
"functionalist" approach to bargaining can produce minimal truthfulness standards);
ADAM SMrrH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 350 (Liberty Classics 1976) (1759)
("The prudent man is always sincere, and feels horror at the very thought of exposing
himself to the disgrace which attends upon the detection of falsehood.").
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In writing this article, I wish to make readers question whether
strengthening current bargaining ethics rules is a worthwhile goal to pursue.
Indeed, I write the article with the intention of making readers conclude that
there is a certain necessity, perhaps even genius, to the "minimalist way" in
which bargaining is currently regulated within the legal profession.
B. The Centralityof Negotiation
The scope of disputes subject to resolution by negotiation is "almost
galactic." 2 1 From negotiating as part of litigation,2 2 to negotiating outside the
courtroom on matters such as adoptions, mergers, wills, contracts,
incorporations, and divorces, negotiation is a fundamental task within all
aspects of the legal profession, both civil 23 and criminal (through negotiated
24
plea bargains).
One scholar suggests that:
We lawyers are generally counted as successful in the degree to which we
are effective at producing instrumental results through our strategic
speaking. Much of our speaking, perhaps even most, takes place in the

21

James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in

Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 926, 927 (1980) (discussing negotiation as a
"process by which one deals with the opposing side in war, with terrorists, with labor or
management in a labor agreement, with buyers and sellers of good, services, and real
estate, with lessors, with governmental agencies, and with one's clients, acquaintances,
and family.").
22 See Marc Galanter, "...
A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge: " Judicial
Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. & Soc'y 1 (1985) (Negotiation "is not some
unusual alternative to litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that it is litigation.
There are not two distinct processes, negotiation and litigation; there is a single process
of disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals that might fancifully be called
LITIGOTIATION." (emphasis in original)).
23 Charles B. Craver writes:
[T]wo professional practitioners who are intimately familiar with the
fundamental interests of their respective clients can usually formulate a more
efficient resolution of the underlying client problem than can an external decisionmaker who will rarely possess the same degree of knowledge or understanding. This
would explain why over 95 percent of law suits are resolved without adjudications.
CRAVER, supra note 15, at 2
24 See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing,and
Plea Bargaining,91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 163 n.1 (2007) ("Plea bargaining accounts for
the vast majority of outcomes of criminal cases, and, despite its critics, the process shows
no sign of decreasing in importance.").
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arenas of negotiation. That is where we reach almost all of our agreements
25
and settle almost all of our differences.

The late Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold suggested that lawyers
are constantly negotiating: "they are constantly endeavoring to come to
agreements of one sort or another with people, to persuade people,
'26
sometimes when they are very reluctant to be persuaded.
C. Lying in Negotiation:Definitions and Parameters
Lying is difficult to define. As Montaigne said, "If falsehood, like truth,
had but one face, we should know better where we are, for we should then
take for certain the opposite of what the liar tells us. But the reverse of the
truth has a thousand shapes and a boundless field."'2 7 Writing in the context
of negotiation, one scholar attempts to subdue and organize this "boundless
field" by creating two categories ("lies" and "deception") into which any
manner of untruth will fall. For this article, I will adopt the following
working definitions of these two categories: A "lie" is "a false statement
made by one who knows its falsity and with the intent to deceive another as

25 Wetlaufer, supra note 9, at 1220. Other commentators have made suggestions
that, within the field of ADR, negotiation is the "horse" while third-party ADR is the
"cart," and wondered:
[I]f the ADR movement has created new hurdles on the road to dispute resolution
even while the negotiation movement has been providing lawyers and disputants
with good advice useful in resolving disputes with less cost, delay, and acrimony. To
avoid this potential negative result, the legal profession-particularly the judiciarymight better serve society by trumpeting negotiation more and pushing third-party
ADR processes or events less.
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality,Fairness, and Freedom in
Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEv. L.J. 305,
344, 347 (2002/2003).
26 Erwin N. Griswold, Law Schools andHuman Relations, 1955 WASH. U. L.Q. 217,
223 (1955); see also Derek C. Bok, A FlawedSystem of Law Practiceand Training,33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 570, 582-83 (1983) (Twenty-five years ago, then Harvard President (and
former Harvard Law School Dean) Derek Bok warned that law students were being
trained "more for conflict than for the gentler arts of reconciliation and
accommodation.").
27 MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE: VOL. 1, at 30-31 (E.J.
Trechmann trans., 1927) (1580); see also John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and
Abuse, 29 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 1, 10 (1997) ("[Un day-to-day professional and personal
lives, people deal with numerous shades of truth, never knowing exactly what truth really
is.").
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to the truth."'28 A "deception" is "any other method of concealing the truth,
including silence." 29 That is, deception has taken place if one party, without
making a false statement, nonetheless manages to create or preserve an
impression in another where that impression is (1) false, (2) known to be so,
30
and (3) intended to conceal the truth.
Interestingly, Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton employ
various terms and phrases ("deliberate deception," "misrepresentation,"
"dirty trick," "trickery," and "false statement") where one might be tempted
to use the word "lie" or "lying." Consider, for example, the text appearing
immediately after the heading "Deliberate deception":
Perhaps the most common form of dirty trick is misrepresentation about
facts, authority, or intentions.. .The oldest form of negotiating trickery is
to make some knowingly false statement: "This car was driven only 5,000
miles by a little old lady from Pasadena who never went over 35 miles per
hour." 3 1
And might the "posturing," "self-serving stances," and "strategic
misrepresentations," as discussed below by Professor Howard Raiffa, be
considered by some to be, simply, lies? Professor Raiffa states:
A common ploy is to exaggerate the importance of what one is giving up
and to minimize the importance of what one gets in return. Such posturing
is part of the game. In most cultures these self-serving negotiation stances
are expected, as long as they are kept in decent bounds. Most people would
not call this "lying," just as they would choose not to label as "lying" the
exaggerations that are made in the adversarial confrontations of a
32
courtroom. I call such exaggerations "strategic misrepresentations."
Is it fair for Professor Raiffa to say that "most people" would not label these
as lying? And at what point do these "strategic misrepresentations"
transgress the so-called "decent bounds" to which Professor Raiffa refers? Is
it only then that they become lies?

28 Peters, Use ofLies, supra note 5, at 11.
29

Id.

30 See id. To what extent is this a distinction without a difference? Sissela Bok notes
that "[iut is perfectly possible to define 'lie' so that it is identical with 'deception.' This is
how expressions like 'living a lie' can be interpreted." BOK, LYING, supra note 6, at 14.
31 FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 15, at 132.
32 HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION: How TO RESOLVE

CONFLICTS AND GET THE BEST OUT OF BARGAINING 142 (16th ed. 2002) (emphasis
added).
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Although one legal scholar concludes that "[t]he problem of lying in
negotiations is central to the profession of law," 33 it is difficult to measure
the frequency with which lies are being told (or their level of seriousness)
because most negotiations take place in private settings. 34 In one survey on
lying, the average of estimates from attorney respondents was that lying
about material facts occurred in 23% of the non-mediated negotiations in
which the respondents participated. 35 Another survey of a national sample of
lawyers found that 51% believed that "unfair and inadequate disclosure of
material information" during pre-trial negotiation was a "regular or frequent
36
problem."
The bottom line is that however it is labeled, and whatever the level of
seriousness, lying and deception occur in negotiation. In this article, I will
focus on conscious, strategic lies that are often motivated by rational
economic incentives inherent in certain kinds of negotiations, and that result

33 Wetlaufer, supra note 9, at 1220. Professor Wetlaufer states further: "If it is true

that lawyers succeed in the degree to which they are effective in negotiations, it is equally
true that one's effectiveness in negotiations depends in part upon one's willingness to
lie." Id.
34 Such private settings do not provide the safeguards available in a court of law,
including (1) elaborate procedural rules; (2) an impartial judge to apply existing law,
enforce limits, and rule on alleged abuses; and (3) an impartial trier of fact to decide
contested issues. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK, ROGER C. CRAMTON &
GEORGE M. COHEN, THE LAW AND ETHIcs OF LAWYERING 737 (4th Ed. 2005); see White,

supra note 21, at 926 (contending that ethical norms can be violated with greater
confidence in negotiation than in other contexts because there will likely be neither
discovery nor punishment).
35 Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in Mediation
and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. DisP. RESOL. 119, 123 (2007) [hereinafter Peters,

Attorney Truthfulness]. The survey, on file with Professor Peters at the University of
Florida Levin College of Law, defined material facts as "event, subject, and other
specifics affecting deals or dispute resolutions that fraud law would consider actionable
as going beyond puffing or acceptable exaggeration." Id. at 123 n.28. When the general
public is polled on their perception of lawyers, the response is troubling: according to an
ABA poll, only one in five Americans considers lawyers to be "honest and ethical" and,
furthermore, "the more a person knows about the legal profession and the more he or she
is in direct personal contact with lawyers, the lower [his or her] opinion of them." Gary
A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60,

62 (1993).
36 Peters, Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 35, at 123 (citing Steven D. Pepe,

Standards of Legal Negotiations: Interim Report and Preliminary Findings (1983)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review)); see also
Peters, Use of Lies, supra note 5, at 3 ("It is against the rules for lawyers to lie, but their
ability to deceive through other means is at least accepted and frequently applauded.").
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from a strong desire to "win" by closing the deal with terms that are highly
favorable to oneself or one's client.
The issues about which people lie and deceive during negotiations are
many and varied. To name but a few, people lie about the following: (1) the
current or future value (including long-term performance claims) of whatever
is being discussed in the negotiation (whether it be goods, services, or
something else); (2) one's goals, priorities, or interests 37 in the negotiation; 3 8
(3) one's reservation point;3 9 (4) one's best alternative option if a deal is not
agreed upon;40 (5) one's willingness, ability, or authority to negotiate or to
reduce the deal terms to contract form; (6) the existence of objective
standards 41 and how they might inform the negotiation; (7) one's own

37 For example, "My client insists he wants custody of the children, although I might
be able to talk him out of it if you let him have the house."
38 On the concept of lying about goals in negotiation:
It is a standard negotiating technique in collective bargaining negotiation and
in some other multiple-issue negotiations for one side to include a series of demands
about which it cares little or not at all. The purpose of including these demands is to
increase one's supply of negotiating currency. One hopes to convince the other party
that one or more of these false demands is important and thus successfully to trade it
for some significant concession.
See White, supra note 21, at 932;
Alert negotiators occasionally discover .. that their opponents really desire an
item that is not valued by their own client. When this knowledge is obtained, many
bargainers endeavor to take advantage of the situation. They try to avoid providing
the other side with this topic in exchange for an insignificant term. They instead
hope to extract a more substantial concession. To accomplish this objective, they
mention how important that subject is to their client and include it with their initial
demands. If they can convince their opponents that this issue is of major value to
their side, they may be able to enhance their client's position with what is actually a
meaningless concession on their part.
CRAVER, supra note 15, at 284.
39 In a negotiation, the reservation point is one's "bottom line," or the maximum
amount that a buyer will pay for a good, service, or other legal entitlement. See Russell
Korobkin, A Positive Theory ofLegal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1791-94 (2000).
40 This is also called one's Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (or
"BATNA"). FISHER, URY & PATrON, supra note 15, at 100 (defining BATNA as "the
standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured. That is the only
standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and
from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept.").
41 Objective standards are outside, independent, third party experts or information
sources that can help determine the value or worth of a deal component within a
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opinions or the opinions of clients, outside experts, or others; (8) the
existence of other offers or competing bidders; (9) one's willingness or
ability to go to trial; (10) promises (including commitments to future
actions) 42 or threats made during the negotiation to entice (or coerce) the
other party into agreement; and (11) the substantive strengths of one's
43
lawsuit, or weaknesses of the other side's lawsuit.
A major difficulty, of course, is that although some lies (such as the
existence of competing bidders or the substantive strength of a given lawsuit)
can usually be proven false by consulting with independent sources and
experts, many lies (such as a person's priorities, underlying interests, or
reservation point) simply cannot be detected, unless one is good at
mindreading.
III. INCENTIVES To LIE INNEGOTIATIONS: SOMETIMES CHEATERS
Do PROSPER
Essentially, negotiation involves dividing a pie. The pie might be "fixed"
in size, it might be shrinking, or it might be expanding in size (a process
sometimes referred to as "value creation")--yet whatever the case may be,
the pie must be ultimately divided, 44 hopefully producing a satisfactory
outcome for all parties.4 5 While some consider negotiation to be merely a
negotiation in a more objective fashion. For example, the objective standard used in
valuing a used car might be the Kelley Blue Book.
42 For example, "This stock will be worth $10,000 in a year from now."
43 White, supra note 21, at 934 ("Everyone expects a lawyer to distort the value of

his own case, of his own facts and arguments, and to deprecate those of his opponent.").
44

See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger: The Weaknesses and
Limitations of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We
Can't All Just Get Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 90 (2007) ("All bargaining.
. .is a lying game to some extent, and one in which adversarial behavior plays an

inevitable role.").
45 One negotiation scholar defines a satisfactory negotiation outcome as:
[O]ne in which [the agreement reached]: (a) Is better than [one's] best altemative to
a negotiated agreement (BATNA); (b) Meets [one's] interests very well, the interests
of the other side acceptably, and the interests of any third parties who may be
affected by the agreement at least tolerably enough to be durable; (c) Is the most
efficient and value-creating of many possible sets of deal terms; (d) Is based on a
norm of fairness or some objective standard, criterion, or principle that is external to
the parties themselves; (e) Identifies commitments that are specific, realistic, and
operational for both sides; (f) Is premised on clear and efficient communications;
and (g) Improves or at least does not harm the relationship between the parties
where "relationship" is defined as the ability of the parties to manage their
differences well."
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"dance of concessions and a battle of wills, '46 negotiation scholars and those
they teach, come to realize that the value of negotiation from a process
perspective is the "potential to use creativity and mutual information
exchange to produce deals that actually enlarge the size of the pie for the
parties. '47 To be a truly fine negotiator, then, one must be skilled in both
enlarging the negotiation pie (when such value creation is possible), and in
48
claiming (at least) a fair portion of that pie.
A. The Dynamics of "Zero-Sum " v. "Non-Zero-Sum " Negotiations
There are times when, no matter how creative the parties involved might
be, the negotiation pie is a "fixed pie," meaning it cannot be enlarged. 49 Such
a situation presents a classic "zero-sum" negotiation, 50 sometimes called a
"distributive" negotiation. A good example is the negotiation involved in
dividing $10 between two parties, both of whom equally value money, and
both of whom need the money immediately. 51 Every dollar one party
Bordone, supra note 5, at 16-17.
46
id. at 17.
47 Id.

48 See generally WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS, supra note 15.
49 See Robert H. Mnookin, StrategicBarriersto Dispute Resolution: A Comparison
of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 12 (2003)
(discussing the "'integrative' possibilities present in some negotiations." (emphasis
added)); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 809 (1984) (stating that one
aspect of problem-solving negotiation "seeks wherever possible to convert zero-sum
games into non-zero-sum or positive-sum games." (emphasis added)).
50 In game theory, a "zero-sum" situation is one in which every point (or dollar,
cookie, etc.) gained by one party is a point lost by the other party, and vice versa, i.e., one
party's gains are the other party's losses. See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY:
ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (1997). For a discussion of negotiation as a zero-sum game, see
Robert Cooter et al., Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
51 Robert Mnookin, Scott Peppet, and Andrew Tulumello point out that value is
more likely created, and deals are more likely agreed upon, when there are differences in
(1) resources ("A vegetarian with a chicken and a carnivore with a large vegetable garden
may find it useful to swap what they have."); (2) relative valuation ("[I]f the two parties
attach different relative valuations to the goods in question, trades should occur that make
both better off."); (3) forecasts ("A singer who expects to draw a standing-room-only
crowd might agree to a guaranteed fee based on 80 percent attendance, plus a percentage
of any profits earned from higher attendance."); (4) risk preferences ("[K]nowing that my
family will face financial hardship if I die [might convince me to] ... pay the insurance
company to absorb that risk."); and (5) time preferences ("Although a standard
[apartment] lease would begin on the first of the month, Jim may need to move in earlier.
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receives is a dollar the other party does not. Both sides will make strong
efforts to win a fair share (or more) of the $10, knowing that nothing can be
52
done to increase the size of the pie.
A non-zero-sum (sometimes called "positive sum" or "integrative")
negotiation is one where both parties focus on expanding the negotiation pie
without being concerned about dividing it up. 53 Consider the example of
three friends who take a two-week vacation every summer. They are
negotiating where to go this coming summer. One wants to hike and camp in
the Rocky Mountains. Another wants to stay in a five-star hotel in Paris,
France. The third person wants to spend the entire two weeks gaming in Las
Vegas. After negotiating, the three decide to stay at the Paris Hotel in Las
Vegas and hike and camp in nearby Red Rock. They have found an
integrative solution that attempts to simultaneously meet (even if not
perfectly) the underlying interests of all three people.
Next, consider the example of Matt, who throws his golf clubs on the
table and says, "I'm tired of golf and want to stop playing." Matt's friend
Sally says, "Well, I'm tired of writing novels," and hoists her laptop
computer onto the same table. Matt then says, "Hey, I would like to write a
novel!" And Sally says, "Hey, I would like to start playing golfl." They
negotiate, and conclude by simply trading the computer for the golf clubs. 54

If it is worth more to Jim to move in early than it costs Sara to move out early, they may
agree to accommodate Jim's schedule in exchange for compensation to Sara.").
MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14-15 (emphasis in original); see also Mnookin,

supra note 49, at 12.
52 See Robert E. Thomas & Bruce Louis Rich, Under the Radar: The Resistance of
Promotion Biases to Market Economic Forces, 55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 301, 328 n.143
(2005) ("Under distributive negotiation, the goal is to get the best deal for yourself by

dividing the negotiation subject in a manner that is most favorable to your side regardless
of how the division affects the other side.").
53 Peters, Use of Lies, supra note 5, at 31; see also David Brin, DisputationArenas:
Harnessing Conflict and Competitiveness for Society's Benefit, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 597, 605 n.23 (2000) ("'Positive sum' occurs when both sides in a game or
conflict or negotiation realize that there are potential strategies under which both can win
at the same time."); John G. Cross, Negotiation as a Learning Process, 21 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 581, 585 (1977) (describing the perspective that the bargaining process is a
"mechanism for dividing the fruits of cooperation"); William Zartman, Negotiation as a
Joint Decision-Making Process, 21 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 619, 622 (1977) (discussing
negotiation as a "positive-sum exercise").
54

See MARvIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS 2 (4th ed. 2001) ("The trading process is not a poker game in which one

player wins what another loses; rather, it is a kind of joint undertaking which increases
the wealth of both parties and from which both emerge with a measure of enhanced
utility."); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121,
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B. The Negotiator'sDilemma
Even in the simple negotiation just concluded by Matt and Sally, parties
must be mindful of the Negotiator's Dilemma. The Dilemma, which
confronts every party at the start of every negotiation, is the following: "How
much information should I reveal to the other party, and when should I reveal
it?" 55 After all, one needs to disclose information to increase the size of the
pie ("I want to stop playing golf, so let's negotiate a deal for my clubs"), and
yet, simultaneously, he or she is concerned that particular pieces of
information, if disclosed, might be used by another party to claim a larger
share of that pie ("If you want to stop playing, then surely you'll sell your
clubs for practically nothing. Would you accept $ 10?").56
Professor Howard Raiffa, in a well-known series of lectures delivered at
Harvard, argued that value creation in negotiation is maximized under
conditions of "FOTE" (Full, Open, Truthful Exchange). 57 However, it
appears that negotiating under conditions of FOTE is in tension with the
Negotiator's Dilemma, and a negotiator must therefore balance how "full"
and "open" to be, given how the information could potentially be used by
other parties for exploitive purposes.
Fisher, Ury, and Patton present the paradigmatic story of two sisters
fighting over the last orange in the refrigerator: the parents, hearing enough,
decide to cut the orange and give each sister half. It is later learned that while
one sister was hungry and wanted only the fruit of the orange, the other sister
was baking and wanted only the zest.58 They argue that if each sister had

1128-29 (1998) ("Two parties can maximize their total utility in the use of their separate
resources when they trade assets and services.").
55 See DAvID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 154-82 (1986).
56 Peters, Use ofLies, supra note 5, at 48; see also MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 15,
at 17 ("[W]ithout sharing information it is difficult to create value, but when disclosure is
one-sided, the disclosing party risks being taken advantage of."). Others have also said:
[W]hen both parties fully disclose information, the chances for an excellent
agreement rise dramatically because each better understands and can accommodate
the other's needs. However, if only one of the parties discloses information, he or
she becomes vulnerable to exploitation by the other. When neither party discloses,
the chances for an effective agreement are dimmed because neither party knows
what the other wants, and it is therefore difficult to explore "win-win" options.
Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:Dealing with Power
Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 68 (2000)
57 HOWARD RAIFFA, LECTURES ON NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 11 (1996).
58 The "zest" is the outermost part of an orange, used for flavoring.

LYING IN NEGOTIATION AND THE ART OF DEFENSIVE SELF-HELP

been able to learn the "underlying interest" of the other, then both sisters
59
could have gotten 100% of what they wanted, instead of 50%.
The orange story appears to bolster Professor Raiffa's advice for a "Full,
Open, Truthful Exchange." This article suggests that such advice needs to be
critically examined and, at times, tempered-especially when other parties
are willing to engage in lies and deception for strategic purposes.
Example One
Consider, for example, a similar orange negotiation between two sisters,
Mary and Sally. Mary is hungry and wants only the fruit of the orange. Sally
is baking and wants only the zest. If Mary is more mindful of the
Negotiator's Dilemma, and if she is willing to lie for exploitive advantage,
the following exchange could easily take place:
Mary: I want the orange!
Sally: I want the orange, too!
Mary: Tell me what your underlying interests are-why do you
want the orange?
Sally: I'm baking, so I only want the zest.
Mary: That's the only part I'm interested in as well. How about
giving me the fruit, which I don't really want that much anyway, and
also give me fifty cents. Then you can have the zest.
Sally: Deal!
So Sally receives the zest, but Mary receives the fruit of the orange
(which is all she wanted to begin with) and fifty cents on top of it (with
which she could purchase yet another orange). The point is this: People lie in
negotiations because it can be extremely effective. 60 In every negotiation, no

59 FISHER, URY & PATrON, supra note 15, at 42, 57.
60 Peters, Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 35, at 138 ("Lies about non-monetized

interests and priorities help deceivers claim value, but do nothing to create value. They
help negotiators divide a pie favorably in their self-interests, but do nothing to expand a
pie to benefit all."); see also Peters, Use of Lies, supra note 5, at 40 ("In every
negotiation each party has incentives for deception.").
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matter how much value-creation occurs to increase the size of the negotiation
61
pie, there comes a point at which that pie needs to be divided.
Example Two
Assume that Mr. Seller is negotiating to sell a house and that his
reservation price (or "bottom line") is $90,000. He will not sell for less than
that amount. Ms. Buyer wants to buy the house. Mr. Seller estimates that Ms.
Buyer's ceiling price is $120,000. (By the way, Mr. Seller is exactly right
regarding this piece of information, even though there's no way for him to
confirm it). After negotiating for several weeks, Mr. Seller, by lying about a
competing bid ("Someone has just offered me $110,000!"), has persuaded
Ms. Buyer that he will not sell the property for anything less than $110,000
(a figure that is $20,000 above his actual reservation price). They continue to
negotiate and eventually split the difference between Mr. Seller's perceived
reservation price ($110,000) and Ms. Buyer's actual reservation price
($120,000). With a final selling price of $115,000, Ms. Buyer is happy
because she believes she has captured exactly half of the available surplus.
Mr. Seller is extremely happy, believing (correctly) that he has captured
$25,000 of the $30,000 surplus, and that he owes it all to his ability as an
effective liar.
Example Three
An art gallery owner has a billionaire client looking for a particular
portrait painted by the famed artist, Pigato. The painting will complete the
billionaire's collection, and he is willing to pay $500,000 to any gallery that
tracks it down. The next day, an impoverished art student walks into the art
gallery carrying the very portrait being sought by the billionaire client. The
gallery owner immediately recognizes the painting but effectively hides his
glee from the student. The following exchange takes place:
Art Student: I want to sell you this Pigato painting. It's a beloved
family heirloom, but I need the money to buy food and medication
for my sick grandmother.
Gallery Owner: I might be interested even though I already have
three other Pigato paintings currently hanging here in my gallery.

61 See Peters, Use of Lies, supra note 5, at 40 (stating that "every negotiation has
zero-sum elements.").
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According to the Official Art Auctions Book of the World,62 the most
recent auctions selling Pigato paintings, all held in the last two years,
sold each of twelve different Pigato paintings, of various sizes and
conditions, for somewhere between $2,000 and $3,000. 1 will
therefore offer you $2,750 for the painting.
Art Student: Are you going to hang the painting here in the
gallery and hope it sells, or have you already found a buyer for the
painting?
Gallery Owner: We purchase paintings from people like you
every single day and try to re-sell them as quickly as we possibly
can. That's what our business is all about. Do we have a deal or not?
Art Student: OK, $2,750 sounds pretty good-it's a deal.
In the next section I analyze these three examples.
C. Drillingfor Information
In Example One, with the orange, one party lied about her underlying
interests (she said she wanted the orange's zest when in fact she only wanted
the fruit). In Example Two, with the house for sale, one party lied about his
best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). 63 The party said he had
a competing bidder when in fact he did not. In Example Three, the gallery
owner did not lie-in fact, according to the working definitions of "lie" and
"deception," it could be argued that the gallery owner did not even engage in
the (seemingly) lesser evil of deception. Rather, he successfully avoided
responding to a question (sometimes called "blocking") 64 asked by the art
student ("Have you already found a buyer for this painting?") and the student
failed to dig deeper for a response that would have addressed the question
directly.

62 This is a fictitious name for a comprehensive book on the art auction world that is

similar to the Kelley Blue Book in the automobile world; the book will provide credible
objective standards for the negotiation.
63 See FIsHER, URY & PATRON, supranote 15, at 97-106.
64 See Paul F. Eckstein, Book Review: Seeking Negotiation'sCutting Edge, 40 ARIZ.

Arr'Y 11 (2004) (discussing various "blocking techniques" to avoid answering difficult
questions).
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These three examples illustrate the difficulty in unearthing information
necessary to prevent oneself from being exploited during negotiation,
whether through lies, deception, or something approaching either one. In
each example, how might one have continued to "drill deeper"? What kinds
of questions could the duped person have asked to keep the conversation
going, and keep the information flowing?
In Example One, the orange negotiation, Sally should have been
suspicious when Mary went ahead and took the fruit, even though she had
previously claimed she did not want the orange "that much anyway." Sally
could have asked, "Why are you taking the orange if you aren't that
interested in it?" Sally, who said she wanted the zest for baking, also could
have asked Mary, "Why are you interested in the zest?" Because Mary was
lying about wanting the zest, she may not have prepared an answer for such a
question. Many times in a negotiation, simply asking "why?," sometimes
repeatedly and in different ways, 65 can be an effective tool in getting at
important information.
In Example Two, the sale of the house, Mr. Seller lies and says he has a
competing bid for $110,000. At that point it was crucial for Ms. Buyer to ask
questions about the competing bidder ( "Can we meet with this person? Can
we meet with their realtor? Can you document the bid?") in order to ensure
that the bid is not a lie. A comfortable and well prepared liar might have
quick and confident sounding responses for such questions, but many people
will not.
And in Example Three, the gallery situation, the art student asked an
excellent question: "Have you already found a buyer for the painting?" The
gallery owner was effective in "blocking" the question. The art student
should have circled back and asked the same question until he received a
satisfactory answer. Of course, the gallery owner could have lied in his initial
response to the question by saying, "No, we don't have a buyer in mind.
Hopefully we will find one soon." At that point, the art student could request
that the gallery owner take the painting on consignment (act as a broker
instead of a cash purchaser in the deal-taking a percentage of whatever
amount the painting is eventually sold for and passing the rest on to the art
student). The gallery owner might well respond by saying he has a strict
policy against doing so. At that point the art student might try to learn,
through questioning the gallery owner, why that is the case-because not
65 Of course, one can ask "Why?" in countless ways, including, "Could you say a

little bit more about that?" or "That's interesting, what do you mean by that?" or "How
do you know that to be the case?"--basically, any statement, usually in the form of a
question or request, that will keep the other party talking and providing information.
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having good reasons for taking firm stances can tend to raise suspicionsand whether an exception could be made for that particular transaction.
The three examples illustrate the power of information in negotiation,
and how important it is to attempt to dig up complete and accurate
information throughout the process. As Professor Wetlaufer concludes in his
seminal article on the ethics of lying in negotiations:
Two things ... are clear. The most important is that we cannot say as a
general matter that honesty is the best policy for individual negotiators to
pursue if by "best" we mean most effective or most profitable. In those
bargaining situations which are at least in part distributive, a category which
includes virtually all negotiations, lying is a coherent and often effective
strategy. In those same circumstances, a policy of never lying may place a
negotiator at a systematic and sometimes overwhelming disadvantage.

Moreover, there are any number of lies, including those involving
reservation prices and opinions, that are both useful and virtually
undiscoverable. Accordingly, if the policy we pursue is one of honesty, we
must do so for reasons other than profit and effectiveness. The second point
is that one who lies in negotiations is in a position to capture almost all of
the benefits of lying while suffering only a small portion of the costs and
that, in the language of the economists, this state of affairs will lead, almost
66
automatically, to an overproduction of lies.

The circumstances faced in many negotiations are similar to those faced
in many Prisoner's Dilemma problems 6 7 wherein the incentive to "defect"
(that is, to act self-interestedly rather than cooperatively) is very high: (1) the
stakes are high in terms of potential gains and losses; (2) information
regarding other negotiation parties is in short supply (or is nonexistent); and
(3) neither side can predict with certainty whether or not the other side will
defect (or in the case of negotiation, lie). Under such conditions, it has been
66 Wetlaufer, supra note 9, at 1230. Of course, Professor Wetlaufer appears to
ignore reputational consequences. See supra note 20.
67 Prisoner Dilemma problems enable one to think about situations (such as
negotiations) in which each party must decide whether to act in a cooperative or a
competitive manner toward the other party. The paradigmatic example plays out on TV
nearly every night on various crime shows: two crime suspects are in jail awaiting trial
for a crime they committed together. The prosecutor says to each suspect, "If you testify
against your accomplice, I will give you less time in jail than if you do not testify." If
neither party testifies (or defects), they each get two years in jail. If both parties testify,
they each get three years. If just one party testifies, that person receives one year and the
other receives four years. In such a two-person prisoner's dilemma, a player receives the
greatest "payoff' if the other party remains loyal while she herself defects. The prisoner's
dilemma serves as a model for certain situations in life in which "the pursuit of selfinterest by each leads to a poor outcome for all." ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 7 (1984); see also RAIFFA, supra note 32, at 123-26.
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suggested that "only saints and fools can be relied on to tell the truth."'68 This
dynamic, however, might be altered if the amount of information flowing
between the parties can somehow be increased. The information flow will
increase if the parties are taught to engage aggressively and relentlessly in
asking questions, seeking information, and digging for answers.
And yet, when attorneys engage in the rough and tumble behaviors that
constitute "digging for answers," there is often a tension between honesty
and less-than-honesty. On the one hand, the lawyer must be a strong
advocate, willing to do almost anything to prevail: in his famous defense of
Queen Caroline, Lord Brougham implores counsel to "save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons" and to
disregard "the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others" in so doing. 6 9 On the other hand, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct remind lawyers they are "officer[s] of the legal system" and "public
citizen[s] having special responsibility for the quality of justice. ' 70 Toward
71
this end, lawyers are to be fair with opposing parties and opposing counsel,

68 Wetlaufer, supra note 9, at 1233; see also RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION
THEORY AND STRATEGY 238 (2002) ("[I]t is intuitively appealing for negotiators to
consider misrepresenting and obfuscating their preferences in an effort to claim a larger
share of the cooperative surplus."); Kathleen M. O'Connor & Peter J. Camevale, A Nasty
But Effective Negotiation Strategy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue, 23
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 504, 507-13 (1997) (discussing a negotiation
simulation in which 28% of the subjects engaged in misrepresentation, either by lying or
by failing to correct a statement made by the other party. On average, negotiators who
misrepresented earned higher scores than those who did not, and 92% of misrepresenters
earned a higher score than their counterpart); see generally Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints
Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 83 (2002).
69 Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 n.1 (1976) (quoting Statement of Lord
Brougham, 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821)); see also Deborah
L. Rhode, An AdversarialExchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext, and Context,
41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29, 29 (1991); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Privatization of Dispute
Resolution: In the Spirit of Pound, but Mission Incomplete: Lessons Learned and a
PossibleBlueprintfor the Future,48 S. TEx. L. REv. 1003, 1020 (2007) (discussing how,
in the context of both mediation and negotiation, the "paradigm of adversarialism...
overshadows other approaches."); RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL
COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED

165 (1999)

("A fundamental tenet of the adversary theorem is that lawyers need not be completely
candid with the other side.").
70

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREAMBLE (2002).

71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2002).
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and they are not to make materially false statements to others.72 There is
clearly a similar tension endemic to negotiation:
Like the poker player, a negotiator hopes that his opponent will
overestimate the value of his hand. Like the poker player, in a variety of
ways he must facilitate his opponent's inaccurate assessment. The critical
difference between those who are successful negotiators and those who are
not lies in this capacity both to mislead and not to be misled.
Some experienced negotiators will deny the accuracy of this assertion,
but they will be wrong. I submit that a careful examination of the behavior
of even the most forthright, honest, and trustworthy negotiators will show
them actively engaged in misleading their opponents about their true

positions... To conceal one's true position, to mislead an opponent about
73
one's true settling point, is the essence of negotiation.
On the one hand, exhibiting cooperative behaviors during a negotiation
(including sharing information, brainstorming ways to meet all parties'
underlying needs, 74 and making trades 7 5 leading to gains for all parties 76) can
allow for effective value creation-for the creation of a "bigger pie." On the
other hand, when it is time to divide that pie, the more distributive aspects of
negotiation (including bluffing, puffing, and lying 77) can ensure one receives
a larger share of that pie. 78 How does one manage that tension? 79 How can

72 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002); see also ZrrIN & LANGFORD,
supra note 69, at 3 ("Every day, American lawyers in a wide variety of practices face
competing ethical principles-among the most important, the choice between
representing a client's interests diligently and being truthful in one's words and deeds.").
73 White, supranote 21, at 927-28 (emphasis added).
74

MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 37; see also STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD

K. NEUMANN, JR.,

ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS:

INTERVIEWING,

COUNSELING,

NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 303 (2d ed. 2003).

75 See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, andStatus Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).
76 It is clear that "differences are often more useful than similarities in helping
parties reach a deal" because it is differences that "set the stage for possible gains from
trade." MNOOKIN ET AL., supranote 15, at 14.
77 See Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the
Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty,56 EMORY L.J. 619, 633 (2006)
(discussing the motivation for "strategic bargaining behaviors such as the assertion of
excessive valuations, deliberate misrepresentation, 'hard' bargaining, calculated delay,
obstruction, and other arguably noncooperative behavior.").
78

See JEFFREY Z. RuBIN & BERT R. BROwN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF

BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION 15 (1975) ("To sustain the bargaining relationship, each
party must select a middle course between the extremes of complete openness toward,
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one be a truly effective negotiator in terms of growing the largest pie
possible, yet still be committed to fairness, ethics, and integrity when the
time comes for pie-splitting? Many scholars have concluded that while this
tension cannot be completely resolved, it can be managed. 80 The goal of
negotiation becomes creating an environment, designing a process, and
implementing behaviors that allow value creation to occur where possible,
while simultaneously being aware of (and thereby minimizing) risks for
8
exploitation. 1
lV. RULES REGARDING TRUTHFULNESS

One scholar of negotiation ethics declares that, "[i]n negotiation, people
who rely on the letter of legal rules as a strategy for plotting unethical
conduct are very likely to get into deep trouble. But people who rely on a
cultivated sense of right and wrong to guide them in legal matters are likely
to do well."' 82 Perhaps an understanding of the "legal rules" on truthfulness
can play a foundational role in developing such a "cultivated sense of right
and wrong." With that in mind, the starting point for exploring ethical norms
governing lying and deception in negotiations is Rule 4.183 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 84 The Rule provides:
and total deception of, the other. Each must be able to convince the other of his integrity
while not at the same time endangering his bargaining position.").
79 White states that the paradox of the lawyer's goal in negotiation is how to "be
'fair' but also mislead." White, supranote 21, at 928.
80 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 27.
81 Id.
82 Shell, supra note 10, at 99.
83 Rule 4.1 only governs lying and deception by lawyers. This article involves a
broader discussion of common law fraud, which, of course, applies to lawyers and nonlawyers alike.
84 Model Rule 8.4, which is a bit more general than Model Rule 4.1, broadly
proscribes lawyers from engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002). In a Formal
Opinion, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility states
that Rule 8.4(c):
[D]oes not require a greater degree of truthfulness on the part of lawyers
representing parties to a negotiation than does Rule 4.1 ... Indeed, if Rule 8.4 were
interpreted literally as applying to any misrepresentation, regardless of the lawyer's
state of mind or the triviality of the false statement in question, it would render Rule
4.1 superfluous, including by punishing unknowing or immaterial deceptions that
would not even run afoul of Rule 4.1 ... Suffice it to say that, whatever the reach of
Rule 8.4(c) may be, the Rule does not prohibit conduct that is permitted by Rule
4.1(a)..
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Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.85

Rule 4.1(a), then, applies only to statements of material fact or law that the
lawyer knows to be false, and thus does not cover false statements that are
made unknowingly, that concern immaterial matters, or that relate to neither
fact nor law.
Within the context of truthfulness in negotiation, whether the topic of
inquiry is misrepresentations, half-truths, 86 or nondisclosure, the focus
nevertheless centers on the same two components: statements and
omissions. 87 Even though Rule 4.1 prohibits false statements of material fact,
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 n.2 (2006).
Nevertheless, Model Rule 8.4(c) "can and has been invoked" to ensure lawyers comply
with their duties "to be honest and fair in negotiation." Menkel-Meadow, Ethics,
Morality, supra note 7, at 137-38.
85 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002).
86 A half-truth is a statement that, although technically accurate, is nonetheless
misleading in some way. As stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "[a]
representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or believes to
be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter is a
fraudulent misrepresentation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (1977).
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[a] statement may be true
with respect to the facts stated, but may fail to include qualifying matter necessary to
prevent the implication of an assertion that is false with respect to other facts."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 cmt. b (1981); see also William B.
Goldfarb, Fraudand Nondisclosurein the Vendor-PurchaserRelation, 8 W. RES. L. REv.
5, 24 (1956) ("While silence alone may not be actionable, if the vendor undertakes to
speak, he must not conceal anything which would tend to qualify or contradict the facts
which he had stated. In other words, to tell half of the truth is to make a half-false
representation."); Langevoort, supra note 9, at 96 n.34 ("[M]ost treatises assume that the
half-truth doctrine is simply a species of actionable nondisclosure.").
87 On the distinction between omissions and half-truths, see Langevoort, supra note
9, at 96:
Just as there is no clean distinction between classic misrepresentations and halftruths, neither is there one between half-truths and nondisclosure . . . Almost all
nondisclosure cases arise in bargaining settings where there is indeed much said
between the parties. Under these circumstances, what the court is being asked to do
is determine what inferences the buyer can fairly draw from the seller's statements
and omissions.
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it has generally been interpreted to permit misrepresentations with respect to
estimates of price or value, and with respect to a party's intentions as to an
acceptable settlement (what amount of money or other benefits would make
for an acceptable "deal"). 88 The official commentary states that "[u]nder
generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or
value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an
acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category..."89
The prohibition of Model Rule 4.1 against lying about material facts is
similar to substantive doctrines of fraud. 90 One legal ethics scholar points out
that state legislatures, courts, and other regulatory bodies (such as the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws) have been expanding the meaning and scope of fraud
91
law in the United States.

Id.
88 Note, however, that while one is permitted to make misrepresentations to
opposing counsel on these matters, one is nevertheless forbidden from lying to a judge on
these same matters; states the ABA's formal opinion on the issue: "The proper response
by a lawyer to improper questions from a judge [on such matters] is to decline to answer,
not to lie or misrepresent." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op.
93-370 (1993).
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 CMT. 2 (2002). Note, moreover, that
care must be taken by a lawyer to prevent communications from being conveyed in
language that converts them, even inadvertently, into false factual representations. For
example, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in one
of its formal opinions states that:
[Elven though a client's Board of Directors has authorized a higher settlement
figure, a lawyer may state in a negotiation that the client does not wish to settle for
more than $50. However, it would not be permissible for the lawyer to state that the
Board of Directors hadformally disapprovedany settlement in excess of $50, when
authority had in fact been granted to settle for a higher sum.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006) (emphasis
added).
90 See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 91 ("Fraud is about human discourse, which is
necessarily contextual and fact-specific.").
91 Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality, supra note 7, at 141. Reflecting these trends,
the Ethics 2000 Commission amended the comments to Model Rule 4.1 to state that a
misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer "incorporates or affirms a statement of another
person that the lawyer knows is false," or if the lawyer makes "partially true but
misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false
statements." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 CMT. 1 (2002); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000) (including several
sections dealing with appropriate negotiation behavior and disclosure requirements, such
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Common law fraud generally requires five elements: (1) a false
representation of a material fact made by the defendant; (2) with knowledge
or belief as to its falsity; (3) with an intent to induce the plaintiff to rely on
the representations; (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the
plaintiff; and (5) damage or injury to the plaintiff by the reliance.92 Victims
can avoid the deal in contract fraud, or they can sue in tort fraud for
93
damages.

A. The Duty ofDisclosure
Generally, the law does not impose a duty on negotiating parties to
disclose information that is harmful to their respective positions, 94 thereby
burdening all parties to conduct their own background research, vigorously
question their negotiation counterpart(s), and take other proactive steps to
unearth or extract such information. In some cases, however, the courts have
imposed a duty to disclose. Professor Nicola Palmieri has identified the
following seven circumstances in which courts have recognized a duty to
95
disclose:
96
(1) all material facts that have been actively concealed must be disclosed;
(2) prior statements that are later discovered to be or turn out to be false
as Section 66 (Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent Death or Bodily Harm),
Section 67 (Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent, Rectify, or Mitigate Substantial
Financial Loss), and Section 98 (Statements to a Nonclient)).
92
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 107-09
(5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 531 (1977). Calamari and

Perillo state the five elements more succinctly: (1) representation; (2) falsity; (3) scienter;
(4) deception; and (5) injury. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 9.13 at 326 (4th ed. 1998).

93 According to Calamari and Perillo, tort damages are usually more difficult to
prove than mere restitution: "[i]nasmuch as [restitution] is designed merely to restore the
situation that existed prior to the transaction, it is not surprising that the requisites
necessary to make out a case for restitution are far less demanding than those necessary
to make out a tort action." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supranote 92, at 326.
94 See id at 336-40; see, e.g., Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson Res. Co., 80 F.3d
976, 985 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that absent a special relationship, there is no duty to
disclose information about a gas well).
95 See Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith DisclosuresRequiredDuring Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 120, 125-141 (1993).

96 Concealment usually occurs when one party actively attempts to hide the true
facts from the other party or parties by using some kind of trick intended to prevent

discovery of (or inquiry into) the concealed fact. See, e.g., Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W.
287, 289 (Ky. 1908); Patten v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 55 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tenn.
1933).
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must be corrected; 9 7 (3) all material facts must be disclosed if anything is
said; 98 (4) all material facts must be disclosed when there is a fiduciary or
confidential relationship between the parties; 99 (5) superior material
information concerning a transaction must be disclosed when the other
party cannot reasonably discover the information and is under a mistaken
belief with regard to it; 10 0 (6) all material facts must be disclosed in the

97 Even if the original representation was in fact true (or was believed to be true by
the speaker) at the time it was communicated, if later events make that original statement
false, or if the speaker learns that the original statement he or she made was in fact false,
then there is a duty to disclose this information to correct the original representation. See
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 696-97 (4th ed. 1971).
98 Even when there is no duty to disclose, if a party volunteers to speak, or if a party
speaks in response to questions, then the response must be "full and fair." This rule was
set forth by the California Supreme Court:

Even though one is under no obligation to speak as to a matter, if he undertakes to
do so, either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, he is bound not only to state
truly what he tells but also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge
which will materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all he must make a full and
fair disclosure ... Where there is a duty to disclose, the disclosure must be full and

complete, and any material concealment or misrepresentation will amount to fraud
sufficient to entitle the party injured thereby to an action.
Pashley v. Pac. Elec. Railway Co., 153 P.2d 325, 330 (Cal. 1944).
99 Generally, courts have held that sophisticated business people negotiating arm's
length business deals are not fiduciaries and therefore are not required to provide full
disclosure of all material facts related to the transaction. See, e.g., The Original Great
Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc., v. River Valley Cookies, 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th
Cir. 1992) (stating that parties to a contract are not fiduciaries to each other). However,
courts have recognized numerous other confidential or fiduciary relationships requiring
full disclosure, including relationships between: employer and employee (see, e.g., U.S.
v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 124 (2d Cir. 1982)); family members (including people
engaged to be married) (see, e.g., U.S. v. Ressler, 433 F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D. Fla.
1977)); attorney and client (see, e.g., Cinema 5 v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386
(2d Cir. 1976)); stockholders and officers of the corporation (see, e.g., Davis Bluff Land
& Timber Co. v. Cooper, 134 So. 639, 641 (Ala. 1931)); joint purchasers (see, e.g.,
Walker v. Pike County Land Co., 139 F. 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1905)); joint owners selling
jointly owned property (see, e.g., Upton v. Weisling, 71 P. 917, 920 (Ariz. 1903)); joint
venturers (see, e.g., Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d 669, 679 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956));
physician and patient (see, e.g., Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir.
1976)); and priest and parishioner or rabbi and congregation (see, e.g., Finegan v.
Theisen, 52 N.W. 619, 622 (Mich. 1892)).
100 The duty to disclose is particularly compelling when one party has superior
knowledge and the unknowing party has been induced to take action it otherwise might
not have taken. See, e.g., Mann v. Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288, 297 (5th Cir.
1977).
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formation of insurance and suretyship contracts; 10 1 and (7) all material facts
02
must be disclosed as required by statute. 1

Professor Palmieri argues that these seven exceptions to the general rule
that a party may remain silent have been used "in an ever widening array of
circumstances," to the point "that the exceptions have almost subsumed the
rule of nondisclosure."' 0 3 Indeed, she believes the exceptions are broad
enough "that a resourceful judge can almost always find a way to fit the facts
of a case within the confines of one of the exceptions."' 0 4 Other scholars
have suggested that this area of law is quite murky and that even a list of
exceptions such as Professor Palmieri's might not be particularly useful for
predictive purposes:
[N]umerous legal commentators have analyzed the law of
fraudulent silence (also referred to as actionable nondisclosure or
actionable silence) in an attempt to identify some guiding principle
that will rationalize the cases and generate accurate predictions of
how courts will rule. Although some commentators point to
various specific factors (for example, whether the withheld
information related to a latent defect or whether the litigating
parties were in a confidential or fiduciary relationship) that courts
consider either alone or in some combination, others conclude that
10 5
courts provide no useful rule of law.

101 The concern is the inequality of knowledge between the parties, which forces the
insurer to rely on the information provided by the insured when assessing risk. Note that
courts have held that a change in circumstances after the policy has been issued
nonetheless requires the insured to inform the insurer of said change, provided it was
substantial and would have led the insurer to cancel the policy or increase premiums if
the insurer had known about the risk. See Weems v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 450 So.2d 431,
436 (Miss. 1984).
102 Palmieri, supra note 95, at 120. For example, the National Labor Relations Act
addresses issues of good faith as it relates to collective bargaining and mandates that "the
employer and the representative of the employees meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement ...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2009). Congress, too, has
mandated a duty to disclose in various consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1716 (2009); Truth-in-Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1601 (2009); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (2009).
103 Palmieri, supra note 95, at 125.
104 Id.
105 Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and
the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (2005); see
also Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 407 (1995) (discussing the law of fraud, including the law of
fraudulent silence, and noting that "there does not seem to be any factor which accurately
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Adding more murkiness is the notion that there is a privilege of
"deserved informational advantage" that can act as a limit on the duty to
disclose.10 6 Essentially, the advantage is gained by any party willing to invest
time and effort into acquiring information through investigation, research,
and analysis.' 0 7 Professor Alan Strudler states:
[O]ther things being equal, the more value one brings to the
bargaining table, the more one may fairly insist upon as return ....
According to the deserved advantage principle account, a buyer's
acquisition of information that increases the value of the object
being sold in a negotiation warrants some additional measure of
bargaining strength, and a privilege of buyer nondisclosure ...
protects the buyer in getting a fair return on the valuable
information that she brings to the table. 10 8
Consider the buyer who, through diligent investigation, learns the seller's
property has been underpriced. Should the buyer have to disclose this
information? Professor Donald Langevoort suggests the answer to that and
similar questions, though perhaps not always clear-cut, appears to be gaining
clarity: "Though the law of nondisclosure is fluid and fuzzy, there is
widespread recognition that parties to a negotiation are privileged to
withhold at least some crucial information from the other, lest there be a
disincentive to the socially beneficial production or discovery of that sort of
information."1 0 9
predicts which policy a particular court will find determinative in a particular case, other

than the merits of the case").
106 Langevoort, supra note 9, at 98.
107 Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principlein the Law ofInsider Trading, 78
TEx. L. REv. 375, 419-20 (1999) (discussing deserved informational advantages in
securities trading).
108 Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law ofNondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REv.
337, 374-75 (1997). Professor Strudler adds:
The commercial world teems with ... intermediaries or middlemen, from jobbers
and distributors to stockbrokers and real estate agents. A financial intermediary is a
bargain hunter; whether searching garage sales for impressionist works of art or
inexpensive farm land for mineral deposits, she seeks to buy low and sell high. A
bargain hunter's job involves exploiting a seller's lack of knowledge.
Id. at 345; see Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of
Contracts,7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978) (putting forth an economics based argument about
disclosure and information incentives); but cf Robert L. Birmingham, The Duty to
Disclose and the Prisoner'sDilemma: Laidlaw v. Organ, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 249
(1988) (criticizing Kronman's economic analysis and arguing that he gets the law of
unilateral mistake wrong).
109 Langevoort, supra note 9, at 89-90. Professor Langevoort later states:

LYING IN NEGOTIATION AND THE ART OF DEFENSIVE SELF-HELP

A further limit on the duty to disclose is woven into Model Rule 4.1 (b),
which requires disclosure of material fact "when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6."110 This "unless" clause imposes a fairly major
limitation on disclosure because Rule 1.6(a) forbids a lawyer from revealing
confidential client information "unless the client gives informed consent."'I I
It follows that if a client instructs the lawyer to keep certain information
secret, Rules 1.6 and 4.1(b) work together to require the lawyer to follow
1 12
those instructions, effectively limiting disclosure.
In summary, in trying to elucidate the complicated and important duty of
disclosure in the context of negotiation, I strongly concur with Professor
The goal of the law here is ... to promote efficiency without chilling the incentive
people have to produce or discover useful data. Intuitively, this suggests a line that
compels disclosure of important but costly-to-obtain information, but with a prima
facie privilege of nondisclosure for facts or inferences that are the product of
something akin to skill or diligence.
Id. at 95; see Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of
Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 65 (1994) (arguing the law of
nondisclosure is fairly fluid, making abstract synthesis quite difficult); see also Kronman,
supra note 108, at 1-2 (arguing that socially valuable "deliberately acquired information"
will disappear if those who obtain it through costly research are forced to share it with
other parties). Professor Langevoort offers an interesting refinement in this area of the
law, centered around the degree of trust between two negotiating parties:
If there is in fact little or no trust between two parties-a truly adversarial setting-it
is difficult to justify the [half-truth] doctrine at all. At least ex ante, I suspect that in
these settings parties will often prefer a default rule of mere technical accuracy, with
its reduced risk of ex post litigation . . . . Conversely, we should expect that
negotiations characterized by a high degree of trust should lead to an upward
adjustment: a broad half-truth doctrine, one with little privilege to conceal once a
matter is addressed at all. In other words, addressing a matter would fully waive the
privilege not to disclose.
Langevoort, supra note 9, at 98.
110 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2002).
111 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002).
112 Of course, the Comment to Rule 1.6 also makes clear that lawyers must
withdraw from representation rather than allow their services to be used to further a
fraud. And Model Rule 8.4(c) similarly provides that "[iut is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2002). Any attorney placed in such a
situation by his or her client may feel compelled to withdraw, unless the attorney can
convince the client that disclosure is the more reasonable course of action. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2000) ("If the lawyer's services will be used
by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the
lawyer must withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16(a)(1).").
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Langevoort's concise characterization of the current state of the law: "fluid
1 13
and fuzzy."'

B. Good FaithRequirement (orLack Thereol) and Puffing
In turning to contract law, the general view appears to be that
negotiations are excluded from coverage of good faith and fair dealing
concepts. The Uniform Commercial Code 114 and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts" 5 both apply the concept of good faith to the performance and
enforcement of contracts, but neither makes reference to precontractual
negotiations. Given that background, most courts have refused to find good
faith obligations in precontractual negotiations. 116 However, although there
might not be a general duty of good faith in commercial negotiations, duties
to one's negotiating counterpart, as well as to various third parties, have

113 Langevoort, supra note 9, at 90.
114 See U.C.C. § 1-304 (2009) (imposing an "obligation of good faith").
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. C (1981).
116 See, e.g., Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236 (Wyo. 1991);
Local 900, Union of Paperworkers Int'l v. Boise Cascade Corp., 713 F. Supp. 26 (D. Me.
1989). At least one scholar argues that neither the U.C.C. nor the Restatement precludes
the application of good faith and fair dealing to precontractual negotiations, noting that:
Although the UCC and Restatement (Second) of Contracts imply a duty of good
faith and fair dealing only in contract performance, one cannot infer from this that
there is no precontractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and, to a lesser extent, the UCC, contemplated the potential
application of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to contract negotiations and did
not intend, by negative inference, to foreclose such application.
Palmieri, supra note 95, at 90-91. Professor Palmieri later states:
Any attempt to characterize the duty of good faith as merely contractual and thus to
deny the existence of the duty when there is no contract is unsustainable because the
duty of good faith exists before any contract is ever entered into... The duty of
good faith belongs to the prevailing practices of the community of people and their
notions as to what constitutes the general welfare. It is a duty permanently present
whenever human beings deal with each other. A breach of this duty is contrary to
public policy and contra bonos mores as these concepts are understood by the
community. A man of probity and intelligence knows that the practices and opinions
of his fellow men, practices and opinions in the midst of which he was born and by
which his own mind and conscience have been formed and educated would not let
breaches of good faith prevail.
Id. at 105.
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nevertheless been increasing, and lawyers should be mindful of these
changing standards. 117
At the same time, there has been a decrease in some of the duties, such as
the duty to investigate, that traditionally burdened parties on the receiving
end of a negotiation information exchange. Historically, in order to recover
for fraud based upon a misrepresentation or an omission, a party had to show
that it had no knowledge of the concealed facts, and that the true facts would
have been difficult to discover through reasonable diligence. In other words,
reliance on a misrepresentation was not reasonable when the plaintiff could
have, through reasonable diligence, learned the truth.1 18 The modem trend,
however, has been to lessen this duty to investigate; parties now have greater
entitlement to rely upon a representation made by another party in a
negotiation, without being burdened with a corresponding duty to investigate.
Professor Palmieri sums it up by saying, "While the traditional view enforced
the concept of caveat emptor, or let the buyer beware, cases following the
modem trend impose a new standard: caveat mendax, or let the liar
beware."119
117 For example, some courts have begun to increase the circle of liability (including
malpractice claims) to protect third parties who rely on what lawyers say to each other.
See generally Ronald E. Mallen, Duty to Nonclients: Exploring the Boundaries, 37 S.

TEx. L. REv. 1147 (1996) (discussing cases where lawyers have been found to owe a duty
of care to individuals outside the traditional attorney-client relationship in matters
ranging from estate planning, to family law, to the representation of partnerships and
corporations). Mr. Mallen concludes that lawyers' duty to non-clients continues to
expand:
In states where no duty was recognized in the past absent privity of contract, courts
are now beginning to recognize a duty owed to an intended beneficiary of the
attorney-client relationship. In those states that have acknowledged a concept of
expanded privity, the rules governing the exception are becoming well defined,
though still developmental.
Id. at 1166; see also A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIGATION, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR

SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (2002) Sections 2.3 (Duty of Fair-Dealing) and 4.3 (Fairness
Issues). While the guidelines aspire to levels of candor and fair dealing that surpass those
set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, their overall impact on negotiation
behavior is unclear; the preface to the document states its provisions "are not intended to
replace existing law or rules of professional conduct or to constitute an interpretation by
the ABA of any of the Model Rules, and should not serve as a basis for liability,
sanctions, or disciplinary action." Id.at 2 (emphasis in original).
118 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir.
1988).
119 Palmieri, supra note 95, at 148. Professor Palmieri concludes that:
There has been a slow but steady trend away from caveat emptor towards an
application of higher standards of good faith, fair dealing, and morality to all
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There has also been increasing scrutiny of lawyers' good-faith
participation in various court-annexed negotiations, including pre-trial
conferences, early neutral evaluation, mediation, and other court-mandated
processes designed to encourage parties to settle disputes without having to
go to trial. Lawyers have been sanctioned for failing to participate or for
participating in bad faith. 120 Even outside the confines of a court-annexed
program, certain bad faith negotiation behaviors can by addressed by the
courts. The matter may be actionable, for example, if a party is using the
12 1 or merely for delay. 122
negotiation process to gain access to trade secrets,
There is a difference, of course, between a factual representation and
mere praise or opinion-known as "puff." Securities law, the common law of
contracts, and the common law of torts all permit puffing. General
commercial law also allows for puffing. For example, the U.C.C. provides
that an express warranty is created by "any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part
of the basis of the bargain."'1 2 3 However, the U.C.C. later states that "an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty."' 124 These latter affirmations fall in the category of "puffs." It can
be difficult to draw a distinction between permissible puffing 125 and
contracts and transactions. The doctrine of caveat emptor is being abandoned and
the rule that negotiations must be conducted with openness and in good faith is
being affirmed.
Id. at 120; see Harris v. M. & S. Toyota, Inc., 575 So. 2d 74, 78 (Ala. 1991) (suggesting
a move away from the doctrine of caveat emptor, and toward the more modem trend that
parties should be able to rely on representations that are not patently false); Formento v.
Encanto Bus. Park, 744 P.2d 22, 27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (buyer can rely on
representation that was put forth and has no duty to conduct independent investigation).
120 See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d. 648 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning a
corporation for failing to send a representative to a pretrial settlement conference, as such
a burden was not out of proportion to the benefits to be gained by both the litigants and
the court).
121 See, e.g., Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d. 578, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting that when a manufacturer pursued a trade secret from an inventor, then made use
of that trade secret, the manufacturer can be held liable for that use).
122 See Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 ARIZ. L. REV.
75, 135-36 (1985) (discussing how negotiating solely for delay, or to burden a third
party, resembles the tort of abuse of process).
123 U.C.C. § 2-313 (2)(a) (2004).
124 U.C.C. § 2-313 (3) (2004).

125 See, e.g., Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that
statements are not fraud if they are "puffery" or opinions regarding future events);

LYING IN NEGOTIATION AND THE ART OF DEFENSIVE SELF-HELP

impermissible factual misrepresentation constituting fraud. 126 Indeed, a
leading hornbook on the U.C.C. declares, "anyone who says he can
127
consistently tell a 'puff' from a warranty is a fool or a liar."'
In summary, in trying to determine whether, and to what extent, there
exists a duty of good faith and fair dealing within the context of negotiation, I
would characterize the current state of the law as fairly muddled. Through
the murkiness one can nevertheless conclude the following: Though the duty
does not rise to one of good faith and fair dealing, negotiators are
nevertheless subject to a somewhat lesser duty of care, and they are currently
being penalized for certain bad faith behaviors such as using negotiation
merely for delay or to gain access to trade secrets. Moreover, it is clear that
parties can now more readily rely upon representations made during a
negotiation, and their corresponding duty to investigate has been decreased.
Finally, when it comes to providing praise or opinion through negotiation
"puffing," it can be quite difficult to draw a distinction between permissible
puffing and impermissible factual misrepresentation constituting fraud.
Together, all of this suggests there remains a good deal of haze and
confusion regarding truthfulness rules and standards in law.
To help confirm this somewhat grim conclusion using more empiricallybased information, I conducted a survey modeled on a survey from twenty
years ago. Data generated from my current survey suggests that confusion

Miller's Bottled Gas, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 955 F.2d 1043, 1051(6th Cir. 1992),
(noting that mere "sales talk" and "puffing" do not reach the level of fraud); Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 163 (Tex. 1995) (holding that
manager's statement that building for sale was "superb," "super fine," and "one of the
finest little properties" in the city was "puffing" and opinion rather than
misrepresentation of fact).
126 See, e.g., Melotz v. Scheckla, 801 P.2d 593, 596 (Mont. 1990) (express warranty
created by using the words "good running condition"); Pake v. Byrd, 286 S.E.2d 588, 590
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (express warranty created by using the words "good condition");
Garrett v. Mazda Motors of Am., 844 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(salesperson's representation to buyer that car had been used mainly by salesperson and
had been "babied to death" when the car had actually been stolen and driven 10,000 miles
by the car thief, was deemed fraud rather than mere puffery).
127 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.4 (4th
ed. 1995); see Charles Pierson, Does "Puff' Create an Express Warranty of
Merchantability? Where the Hornbooks Go Wrong, 36 DUQ. L. REv. 887, 891 (1998)
(arguing that "[n]umerous decisions have found that statements that hombooks would
label 'puff create express warranties."); see, e.g., Ellmer v. Dela. Mini-Computer Sys.,
Inc., 665 S.W.2d 158, 160-61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (warranty created by describing a
computer with the words "first-rate").
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over truthfulness rules and standards not only exists, but has actually
increased during the last twenty years.
V. DISAGREEMENT AND CONFUSION REGARDING TRUTHFULNESS RULES
AND STANDARDS

A. The 1988 Survey
An article published twenty years ago entitled In Settlement Talks, Does
Telling the Truth Have Its Limits? illustrates the differences of opinion
among lawyers regarding truthfulness standards in negotiation. 128 The
article's author, Larry Lempert, surveyed fifteen lawyers, asking them how
they would respond to four negotiation situations presenting various ethical
challenges. The survey participants included eight law professors, five
29
practicing lawyers, a federal judge, and a U.S. magistrate.1
There was strong consensus among the participants on only one of the
four questions asked in the survey. Following are the four situations, as well
as a listing of how the participants responded-i.e., did they respond with
"yes," "no," or "qualified" (meaning a response that was more qualified or
tentative than a straightforward "yes" or "no"):
Situation 1:
Your clients, the defendants, have told you that you are authorized to pay
$750,000 to settle the case. In settlement negotiations after your offer of
$650,000, the plaintiffs' attorney asks, "Are you authorized to settle for
$750,000?" Can you say, "No I'm not"? Yes or no and please explain.
Qualified: Two
No: Six
Yes: Seven
Situation 2:
You represent a plaintiff who claims to have suffered a serious knee
injury. In settlement negotiations, can you say your client is "disabled" when
you know she is out skiing? Yes or no and please explain.
Qualified: None
No: Fourteen
Yes: One

128 See Larry Lempert, In Settlement Talks, Does Telling the Truth Have Its Limits?,
2 INSIDE LITIGATION 1 (1988).
129 Id. at 15.
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Situation 3:
You are trying to negotiate a settlement on behalf of a couple who charge
that the bank pulled their loan, ruining their business. Your clients are quite
up-beat and deny suffering particularly severe emotional distress. Can you
tell your opponent, nonetheless, that they did? Yes or no and please explain.
Yes: Five
No: Eight
Qualified: Two
Situation 4:
In settlement talks over the couple's lender liability case, your
opponent's comments make it clear that he thinks plaintiffs have gone out of
business, although you didn't say that. In fact, the business is continuing and
several important contracts are in the offing. You are on the verge of
settlement; can you go ahead and settle without correcting your opponent's
misimpression? Yes or no and please explain.
Qualified: Two 130
No: Four
Yes: Nine

B. The 2008 Survey
Given that two decades have passed since Lempert's work was
conducted, I thought it would be helpful to send out another survey. I mailed
out the same four ethically challenging situations to thirty lawyers
throughout the country to see if, twenty years later, there might be greater
consensus in the answers given. The survey participants included eight law
professors, twenty-one practicing lawyers, and a federal judge. 13 1 Following
is a listing of how the participants responded (together with the results from
130 Id.
131 Survey results are on file in my office at the William S. Boyd School of Law.

The lawyers filling out the questionnaires are people I met during law school and during
my fifteen year career in various law-related jobs (including law clerk, federal
government attorney, Hewlett Fellow in conflict resolution, and law professor). These
individuals, in turn, sent the questionnaire to attorney colleagues and acquaintances of
their own-people I have never met. While the lawyers who responded are engaged in
varied practice areas, work in both the public and private sectors, and live in states
throughout the country, the survey could hardly be called a valid empirical study, just as
the individuals responding to the survey could "hardly be called a sample of anything
other than lawyers ... who were willing to share their observations." Peters, Attorney
Truthfulness, supra note 35, at 121 n.12; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to
Clientsfor Economic Gain or PaternalisticJudgment. A Proposalfor a Golden Rule of

Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 761, 761 n.4 (1990). Nevertheless, the 1988 survey and the
current survey lend support to the notion that haziness and confusion prevailed both
twenty years ago and today regarding truthfulness rules and standards in law.
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1988). Both raw numbers and percentages are included, for the sake of
comparison:
Situation 1:
Your clients, the defendants, have told you that you are authorized to pay
$750,000 to settle the case. In settlement negotiations after your offer of
$650,000, the plaintiffs' attorney asks, "Are you authorized to settle for
$750,000?" Can you say, "No I'm not"? Yes or no and please explain.
1988: Yes: Seven (47%)
No: Six (40%)
Qualified: Two (13%)
2008: Yes: Eight (27%)
No: Eighteen (60%) Qualified: Four (13%)
Situation 2:
You represent a plaintiff who claims to have suffered a serious knee
injury. In settlement negotiations, can you say your client is "disabled" when
you know she is out skiing? Yes or no and please explain.
1988: Yes: One (7%)
No: Fourteen (93%)
Qualified: None (0%)
2008: Yes: Six (20%) No: Twenty (67%)
Qualified: Four (13%)
Situation 3:
You are trying to negotiate a settlement on behalf of a couple who charge
that the bank pulled their loan, ruining their business. Your clients are quite
up-beat and deny suffering particularly severe emotional distress. Can you
tell your opponent, nonetheless, that they did? Yes or no and please explain.
1988: Yes: Five (33.3%) No: Eight (53.3%)
Qualified: Two (13.4%)
2008: Yes: Seven (23.3%) No: Twenty-two (73.3%) Qualified: One (3.4%)
Situation 4:
In settlement talks over the couple's lender liability case, your
opponent's comments make it clear that he thinks plaintiffs have gone out of
business, although you didn't say that. In fact, the business is continuing and
several important contracts are in the offing. You are on the verge of
settlement; can you go ahead and settle without correcting your opponent's
misimpression? Yes or no and please explain.
1988: Yes: Nine (60%)
No: Four (27%)
Qualified: Two (13%)
2008: Yes: Twenty-two (73.3%) No: Seven (23.3%) Qualified: One (3.4%)
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C. The Results
The results of the most recent survey indicate that strong differences of
opinion still exist today, just as they did twenty years ago. In fact, it could be
argued that the differences of opinion are even greater today, given that there
was not a strong consensus among the participants on any of the questions in
2008. (Twenty years ago, on the other hand, consensus was expressed in
"Situation 2," with fourteen people responding "No" and only one person
responding "Yes."). 132 Although a more sophisticated survey, and more
sophisticated sampling methods, might have been used both twenty years ago
and today, the results nonetheless suggest that confusion regarding
truthfulness standards in negotiation was present then, and is still present
today-especially given that the ethics situations presented in the surveys
were not particularly elaborate or complicated.
VI. WHY RAISING THE ETHICAL BAR FOR LAWYER-NEGOTIATORS
WOULD LIKELY FAIL
One way to try to ensure fairness and integrity in the negotiation process
is to simply mandate it: Write strict proscriptions against behaviors such as
lying, indeed, any kind of lying, into rules of professional conduct for
lawyers. In reviewing the negotiation literature in the area of lying and
deception, the vast majority of legal academics writing on the subject have
advocated strengthening the duty of candor under the rules of professional
conduct. 13 3 In some instances, the proposed solution is to strengthen (or even
132 One person who responded "Yes" to this question in 2008 states, "I don't think
the two are necessarily mutually exclusive." A person who gave a "Qualified" answer to
this question in 2008 states, "I assume for this situation that there is some part of the knee
injury which is ongoing or renders the person disabled for the purpose that they would
typically use it for (i.e., maybe they can ski with accommodations, but cannot run, or sit
in a chair which they need to do for work, etc.). However, if the lawyer is claiming total
disability, then they could not make this statement." All answers are on file with the
author at William S. Boyd School of Law.
133 Of course, several academics and practitioners have argued that the rules of
professional conduct regarding truthfulness do not need to be strengthened. They argue
that either the status quo is fine or that the current rules are, in fact, already too stringent
and should therefore be interpreted with greater leeway or eliminated all together. More
specifically, they make the following arguments: (1) because lawyers already find it
"extremely difficult" to conform to the limited obligations for truthfulness imposed by
current rules, imposing any greater burden would be problematic (see Robert P. Bums,
Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 691, 696-97 (2001));
(2) because of the inability to enforce rules regarding negotiation truthfulness, all current
rules should be eliminated and negotiators should simply adhere to the maxim, "caveat
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create from whole cloth) one or more rules of professional conduct. 134 In
other instances, the call is far more general, simply imploring negotiators to
exhibit honesty or good faith in their work. Scholars wishing to raise the
ethical bar for lawyer-negotiators have advocated the following:
(1) Forbid lying and all other forms of deception in a negotiation, and
1 35
require disclosure of all facts known to be important to the other party;
(2) Promulgate new Model Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers in
Negotiation ("MRPCN") that provide sanctions for results failing to "at least
adequately meet the interests of both sides." 1 36 The rules would also omit the
word "material" from the current Model Rule 4.1(a), thereby forbidding
37
lawyers from making any false statement of fact or law to a third person;1
(3) Lawyers, when negotiating, would owe each other an obligation of
"total candor and total cooperation to the extent required to insure that the
138
result is fair";
(4) Lawyers "should not misrepresent or conceal a relevant fact or legal
principle to another person," nor should they "intentionally or recklessly
deceive another or refuse to answer material and relevant questions in
representing clients." 139 In essence, lawyers should "do no harm" and adhere
lawyer" (see Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 99,
125 (1982)); and (3) the legal regulation of trustworthiness "cannot go much further than
to proscribe fraud" (see Hazard, supra note 16, at 196); see also Van M. Pounds,
Promoting Truthfulness in Negotiation: A Mindful Approach, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REv.
181, 197 (2004) (concluding that Professor Hazard was correct in his assessment)).
134 See Fairman, supra note 18, at 707 ("I confess I have an affinity for rules.");
Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for CollaborativeLaw, 21 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 73, 75 (2005) ("Rules of ethics serve a vital educational function. Those
who are new to the practice of law need guidance on their role and responsibilities.
Similarly, lawyers who are new to a particular practice area benefit from clear rule-based
guidance. This is particularly true in the field of alternative dispute resolution."); Peters,
Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 35, at 141 ("Creating an objective rule may help
lawyers change their behavior because lawyers are generally familiar with rules and
comfortable measuring their actions against regulations.").
135 Peters, Use of Lies, supra note 5, at 50 (noting that a large impediment to
establishing such a convention is "the fact that it is very difficult for one negotiator to
know whether the other has used deception").
136 Bordone, supra note 5, at 30.
13 7 Id.

138 Steele, supra note 5, at 1403 (noting the rule "is not designed for specific
situations," but instead "points toward an ethos of high-toned morality among negotiating
lawyers").
139 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Limits of Adversarial Ethics, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 123, 136 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000).
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to a "golden rule" of treating all parties to a legal matter as they would wish
140
to be treated themselves;
(5) Implement a standard of good faith for mediation, 14 1 including open
and frank discussions about the case at hand, "not lying when asked a
specific and direct question," and "not intentionally misleading the other
42
side";1
(6) Amend state versions of Model Rule 4.1 (and its Comments) to
143
prohibit false statements about interests and priorities;
(7) Adopt a rule mandating that lawyers negotiate "honestly and in good
45
faith" 144 and prohibiting "unconscionably unfair" results; 1
140 Id. The idea of incorporating a greater sense of fair play into the Model Rules is

not new; a discussion draft of the Model Rules from 1980 would have included a new
Model Rule 4.2 requiring that "[i]n conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in
dealing with other participants." A. B. A., Comm'n on Evaluation of Prof. Standards,
Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1980).
141 Mediation is merely a facilitated negotiation. See Peter Robinson, Contending
With Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Mediation

Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 963, 964 (1998) ("Mediation is facilitated negotiation. In
mediation the parties retain the decision making authority and thus participate as
negotiators in the mediation. Existing literature on negotiation advocacy provides helpful
insights for a discussion of effective mediation advocacy.").
142 Kovach, supranote 15, at 963.
143 Peters, Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 35, at 139. Such amendments,

however, would not limit lying about value estimates and settlement intentions, as
currently allowed under Model Rule 4.1. Id. at 139. Note that another scholar advocates
outright repeal of Model Rule 4.1, stating, "Since no one has apparently made a
persuasive argument that lawyer negotiators cannot operate on a high plane, the
presumption of honest behavior should remain, and the exception to the requirement of
truthfulness for lawyers engaged in negotiations, created by Model Rule 4.1 and its
Comment, should be repealed." Thurman, supra note 5, at 116. Still another scholar
proposes revising Model Rule 4.1 by eliminating the word "material" and eliminating the
commentary language attempting to distinguish between "material" facts and other kinds
of facts. James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A
Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 255, 269-70 (1999); see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder. Ethics for a New Practice, 70

TENN. L. REv. 63, 95 (2002) (arguing that the misrepresentation permitted by Model Rule
4.1's commentary is problematic because there are "no obligations to volunteer
information or to correct misinformation by other parties or lawyers in the proceedings
unless the duty is imposed by other law, such as state fraud law or rules of civil
procedure").
144 Rubin, supra note 5, at 589-90 (adding "[s]ubstantial rules of law in some areas
already exact of principals the duty to perform legal obligations honestly and in good
faith. Equivalent standards should pervade the lawyer's professional environment. The
distinction between honesty and good faith need not be finely drawn here; all lawyers
know that good faith requires conduct beyond simple honesty.").
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(8) Attorneys and clients could choose to conduct negotiations under
Model Rule 4.1 as it currently stands, or they could decide to invoke the socalled new Rule 4.1(2), mandating negotiating in good faith 146 with an
honest 147 and open 14 8 exchange of information. 149 While this would require
disclosure of material information about fact and law,15 0 parties would not be
required to disclose their "bottom line" or reservation point, the priority of
their interests, or their preferences regarding different settlement issues. 15 1
There are, of course, difficult issues surrounding the idea of raising the
ethical bar on truthfulness. First, raising the bar might be politically difficult
to accomplish, taking years before changes are approved and implemented
into the various state versions of the Model Rules. 152 Second, strict rules
regarding truthfulness might generate additional legal complaints, actions,
and maneuvers concerning whether or not the rules have been brokensomething that could potentially be used as a weapon for harassment or
delay. 153 Third, raising the bar might lead to a preference for hiring non145 Id. at 591.
146 Lawyers would agree to negotiate in good faith by, "among other things,
abstaining from causing unreasonable delay and from imposing avoidable hardships on
another party for the purpose of securing a negotiation advantage." Peppet, Bargaining
Ethics, supra note 15, at 523.
147 Lawyers would agree to "be truthful in all respects regarding the matter for
which this section has been invoked." Id.
148 Lawyers would agree to "disclose all material information needed to allow the
third person in question to make an informed decision regarding the matter." Id.
149 Professor Peppet also draws up new Rule 4.1(3), which goes even further,
allowing parties to opt into a requirement for general fairness. Under this provision,
lawyers and clients agree to "refuse to assist in the negotiation of any settlement or
agreement that works substantial injustice upon another party." Id. at 523-24. It appears
that Peppet's new Rule 4.1(3) is even more aspirational than 4.1(2), and the two can be
invoked together. Id. at 524.
150 Id. at 525.
151 Peppet, BargainingEthics, supra note 15, at 524-25.
152 See Pounds, supra note 133, at 195-96 (discussing how Rule 4.1, with changes
in the last decade that have been "few and arguably inadequate," has "withstood the
challenge of some twenty years of scholarly debate and criticism" and will "likely
continue to survive further challenge"); see also Fairman, supra note 18, at 736
(discussing how, despite years of advocacy, "it was not until 2002 that recognition of the
most basic form of ADR - use of a third-party neutral - found its way into the Model
Rules." Professor Fairman suggests the "lesson to be learned" is that "[e]ven the most
basic recognition of the reconceptualization of lawyer roles takes a long time.").
153 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 294 (discussing how more stringent
ethical rules could become "one more weapon in the adversarial arsenal, with each side
threatening to bring ethics violation charges against the other"); see also Peppet,

522
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lawyers to carry out one's negotiations. These individuals, not bound by
strict ethics rules, would be free to lie, deceive, and behave more like
"amoral gladiators" in executing their clients' deals. 154 Fourth, stricter rules
do not necessarily translate into more ethical attorney behavior. 155 Finally,
the enforcement of stricter rules could be quite difficult, especially given that
negotiations tend to occur in private locations, with no official record of
156
conversations or events.
Bargaining Ethics, supra note 15, at 536 (discussing strategically motivated disciplinary
litigation brought to harass or intimidate opposing lawyers).
154 See, e.g., Peppet, Bargaining Ethics, supra note 15, at 510 ("If the bar imposed
an aspirational bargaining ethic on all lawyers, some set of clients would stop turning to
lawyers as their negotiating agents. That set of clients prefers hard-bargainers, and
attorneys would no longer qualify."). Professor Peppet also argues that the "standard
conception of the lawyer's role" is that of an "amoral gladiator" and that most lawyers
view themselves as "partisan and zealous advocate[s], dedicated to the client's cause, and
absolved of responsibility for that cause and its pursuit, so long as the lawyer acts within
the bounds of the law." Id. at 500; David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE
GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHics 83, 90 (David Luban ed.,
1983) (discussing what Luban calls the "adversary system excuse" used by attorneys to

justify serving their clients with "moral ruthlessness"); Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of
Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from The Collaborative Lawyering Research
Project, 2004 J. DisP. RESOL. 179, 201 (2004) (describing how some lawyers can

experience tension, even an "acute sense of role dissonance," when they switch from
traditional advocacy approaches of lawyering to consensus-building and problem-solving
approaches); Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, Morality, supra note 7, at 129 (arguing that the
"long-standing American belief" that the adversary system is the most effective way to
learn the truth or achieve justice is "still unsubstantiated by empirical verification");
Annette J. Scieszinski, Return of the Problem-Solvers: The Profession Needs to Focus on
Helping People, Not Just Fighting Battles, 81 A.B.A. J. 119, 119 (1995) ("The media,

which for better or worse educates the public about the role of the lawyer, paints a
gladiator who will end up either the conqueror or the conquered.").
155 See Kovach, supra note 15, at 955 ("Not all change will or can be accomplished
by ethics alone.., rules must be complemented by additional efforts"); Greg K. McCann
et al., The Sound of No Students Clapping: What Zen Can Offer Legal Education, 29
U.S.F. L. REv. 313, 325 n.53 (1995) ("'Learning the code' is not the answer to the
perceived lack of ethics in the profession"); Pounds, supra note 133, at 196 (discussing
the "inherent weakness of the written rule" and opining that "[w]ords have a limited
capacity to articulate, much less regulate, ethical conduct."); but see Rhode, supra note
18, at 730 (arguing that, particularly in contexts where the threat of sanctions is remote,
an important role of codified norms is "symbolic and educational; they can sensitize
professionals to the full normative dimensions of their choices. A collective affirmation
of professional values may have some effect simply by supplying, or removing, one
source of a rationalization for dubious conduct.").
156 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 293-94 (discussing how more stringent

ethical rules would be "very difficult to enforce" and opining that, "[t]o some extent, the
minimal nature of Rule 4.1 codifies not only conventional wisdom but also a system that
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Indeed, the enforcement issue presents an especially thorny problem.
Many of the proposals take an absolutist approach with respect to
truthfulness: No lying, period. But such a standard might be nearly
impossible to enforce. The problem is that issues at the core of a negotiation
(interests, priorities, value estimates, and claim settlement intentions) reside
within the minds of the lawyers and their clients. Moreover, these issues are
quite malleable; transforming and evolving as negotiations move forward
because of changing relationship dynamics; because new information is
revealed or becomes available; or because old information is seen in a new or
different light based on changing interactions, circumstances, or events. One
scholar's description of mediation precisely captures the internal dynamics of
a typical negotiation: "[They] are usually dynamic experiences that
continually develop new information which often causes participants to reevaluate risks and reframe objectives. These re-evaluations and reframes are
typically strongly influenced by participants' emerging sense of what is
important to themselves and others and what is possible in the
157
negotiation."'
How, then, might one realistically enforce a rule that bans (or drastically
limits) lying in negotiation? Proving a violation would require something
close to mind-reading ability, not only to know initial stances on interests,
priorities, value estimates, and claim settlement intentions, but also to be able
to see the constantly changing positions on these matters as the negotiation
winds its way from beginning to end. 15 8 For these reasons, raising the ethical
bar for lawyer-negotiators would likely fail.

is at least somewhat enforceable"); see also Paul Rosenberger, Note, Laissez- "Fair":An
Argument for the Status Quo Ethical Constraintson Lawyers as Negotiators, 13 OfIlo ST.

J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 611, 627 (1998) (discussing difficulties involved in monitoring for
enforcement, which would make negotiations "more like a 'tribunal' and remove many of
the benefits that have made it such an attractive informal dispute resolution
mechanism."). Rosenberger argues that deceptive behavior is "indigenous to most legal
negotiations and could not realistically be prevented because of the nonpublic nature of
most bargaining interactions." Id.at 626-27 (noting that in a negotiated settlement, there
is no trial and no public testimony by conflicting witnesses, and thus no opportunity to
examine the truthfulness of the assertions made during the negotiation. In such a
situation, Rosenberger believes that "the honest lawyer may be forfeiting a significant
advantage for his client to others who do not follow the rules").
157 Peters, Attorney Truthfulness, supra note 35, at 140 (citations omitted).
158 On the other hand, even if it is difficult (or nearly impossible) to enforce, the
proposed rule might influence lawyers' beliefs and conduct. See Gary Tobias Lowenthal,
The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics
411, 444 (1988) (discussing how rigorous ethics rules, when included in law school
curricula and bar examinations, "may influence professional socialization, even without
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VII. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: DEFENSIVE SELF-HELP MINDSETS,
STRATEGIES, AND TECHNIQUES

I have argued that: (1) for various reasons, people sometimes lie and
deceive during negotiation; (2) there appears to be widespread disagreement
and confusion regarding truthfulness rules and standards for lawyers; and (3)
even when rules and standards are clearer, enforcement is quite difficult
because most negotiations take place in private settings rather than in open
court. I have also argued that, although numerous academics have
recommended doing so in past law review articles, simply raising the ethical
bar for attorney-negotiators would likely not be an effective solution to the
problem. So what to do? One possible solution is to simply assume that lying
and deception sometimes occur, and therefore arm all negotiation
participants (lawyers and non-lawyers alike) with mindsets, strategies and
techniques that will enable them to defend themselves against the liars and
deceivers.
This final part of this article, then, offers prescriptive advice for
minimizing one's risk of being exploited in a negotiation should other parties
lie. The following suggestions are undergirded by the notion, expressed
throughout this article, that information exchange (or lack thereof) plays a
pivotal role in all negotiations. 159 Indeed, information is the lifeblood of any
negotiation, 160 and therefore, the mindsets, strategies, and techniques that
influence if, when, and how information is obtained and/or exchanged (and
that influence how complete and accurate that information will be) are

significant changes in enforcement" and how "reinforcing a person's sense of social

responsibility might be effective in influencing conduct").
159 See generally Steven Shavell, Acquisition andDisclosure ofInformation Priorto
Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1994) (analyzing the incentives of acquiring information
about the value of things prior to negotiations).
160 See Adler & Silverstein, supra note 56, at 67-70 (discussing the importance of
information exchange for value creation and positive negotiation outcomes); but see Jean
R. Stemlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 437,
526-27 (2008) (discussing studies showing that sometimes attorneys have a "tendency to
seek out even irrelevant information." Professors Sternlight and Robbennolt therefore
suggest that "as the attorney feels the need to seek out information she should at least ask
herself: 'Is this information really important? If I found out X, what would I do? And if I
found out not-X, what would I do?' Perhaps the attorney, having had this internal
conversation, will realize that the information she thinks she needs is not important after
all.").
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extremely important in the process of defending one's self (or one's client)
against lying and deception.
A. Conduct Thorough Background Research
Conducting a search on various Internet search engines (such as Yahoo!
or Google) can often yield large amounts of information about other parties
to the negotiation. Websites established by private companies, government
entities, and various nonprofit groups are available for criminal, financial,
and other background checks. 16 1 If possible, speaking with groups or
individuals who have previously worked with or negotiated with one's
potential negotiation counterparts can be very illuminating. 162 It can be
surprising how much of a "reputation" people develop, 16 3 sometimes
favorable and sometimes unfavorable, based on previous negotiation
behavior.
Consider the earlier example of the art gallery owner from Part III.B who
negotiated the purchase of a painting from a starving art student for $2,750
and who could quickly turn around and re-sell the painting to another client
for $500,000.164 Keep in mind that the art student asked specifically, before
the deal closed, if the gallery owner had already located a buyer for the
painting, but the owner effectively evaded the question and the student
agreed to the deal. Pretend that the art student found out a short time later
that the gallery owner did in fact have a buyer at the ready, and one who was
willing to pay half a million dollars for that specific painting. Once the art
student begins talking to his artist friends (or perhaps holds a press
conference) about what transpired, the gallery owner's reputation (among
artists, art collectors, and even those outside the arts community) would be
negatively impacted, perhaps even drastically so.

161 One can also simply ask other negotiation parties directly for credentials, credit
records, and references.
162 See HERB COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING: HOW TO GET WHAT YOU

WANT 103 (1980) (urging negotiators to gather information "[flrom anyone who works
with or for the person you will meet with during the event or anyone who has dealt with
them in the past. This includes secretaries, clerks, engineers, janitors, spouses,
technicians, or past customers.").
163 See supranote 20.
164 See supra Part III.B.
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B. Network for PotentialNegotiation Counterparts
There are times when one has no control over who will sit on the other
side of the negotiation table. However, in those instances when one can play
a role in selecting negotiation counterparts, one should attempt to do so
through referrals, recommendations, or outside introductions. This is a
compliment to the party being approached, which can generate feelings of
goodwill and help solidify new working relationships should the negotiation
process move forward. Initial meetings through referrals and introductions
also signal that there is a greater prospect for the development of long-term
relationships. Research suggests that, in general, even the prospect of a longterm relationship raises people's ethical standards and reduces exploitative
conduct such as lying. 165 Using the art gallery scenario again as an example,
what if the student had sought a referral to that same gallery from someone
else in the community? In other words, what if the art student entered the
gallery and said, "My name is Art Student, and I come to you at the
recommendation of Walter Warbucks, who has bought many of his best
paintings here." Quite likely, the art gallery owner's negotiation behavior
would have been different under such circumstances. Indeed, the person who
referred the art student would have an impact similar to that of a chaperone at
the high school prom, even if that person were not present during the
negotiations.

C. Create Rapport
A cordial and supportive environment (one infused with sincerity,
understanding, impartiality, empathy, and expressions of genuine concern for
the other party 166) will probably not magically prevent lies or encourage
people to disclose their deceitful behavior. However, research suggests that
such an environment can lead to these individuals relaxing their defenses and
167
providing information that may be used to secure the truth in the future.
165 G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES

FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 226 (1999).
166 See Sternlight & Robbennolt, supra note 160, at 503 (discussing behaviors that
contribute to building and maintaining a sense of rapport during conversation, including
facing the other party directly, leaning forward, keeping arms open instead of crossed,
smiling, nodding, and sharing personal or shared interests to develop connection).
167 KRIEGER & NEUMANN, JR., supra note 74, at 81; see also Sternlight &
Robbennolt, supra note 160, at 503 ("[P]sychological research has found that rapport can
result in increased trust and more cooperative interactions. More generally, people tend to
remember and disclose greater amounts of information when they feel comfortable and at
ease."); Linda Tickle-Degnen & Robert Rosenthal, The Nature of Rapport and Its
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Specific tactics can be employed within the more relaxed atmosphere that
encourage the responder to share increased amounts of information. This
includes using exclamations of encouragement such as "Yes?" or "I hear
you," or "Go on." This can be coupled with requests for immediate
elaboration on certain topics: "Could you tell me more about that?" or "Can
you flesh that out a bit?"'168 Research shows that people are more inclined to
lie by omission (not revealing the whole truth) than by commission (falsely
answering a question when asked), 169 so when they are asked to elaborate
and thereby make direct statements that are lies, some people cannot do it
and will back away from earlier statements. Finally, one can neutralize the
harshness of asking a negative question by implying the question is a playful
one. For example, "May I play the devil's advocate for a moment?" is one
170
way to blunt the harshness of a request for information.
In one of the examples from Part III.B the seller of a house lies about a
competing bid ("Someone has just offered me $110,000!"), thereby
persuading the potential buyer that the seller's bottom line is $20,000 higher
than is his actual bottom line. 171 By lying, the seller reaps a substantial
monetary benefit in the negotiation. But would the seller have lied if more
rapport had been created during the negotiation? 172 Moreover, might the
seller have backed away from the lie ("They just withdrew their $110,000
offer!") if the buyer had requested immediate elaboration regarding the bid
("Can you tell me more about the party?" or "How did that bid come
through?" or "Can I speak with their realtor?").

Nonverbal Correlates, 1 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 285, 287 (1990) (stating that parties that are
familiar with each other are "at ease in expressing dissent one minute and assent the
next.").
168 See Stephen Moston & Geoffrey M. Stephenson, The Changing Face of Police
Interrogation,3 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 101-15 (1993).
169 Maurice E. Schweitzer & Rachel Croson, CurtailingDeception: The Impact of
Direct Questions on Lies and Omissions, in WHAT'S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS,

supra note 15, at 175-99 (discussing studies where far more subjects were willing to lie
by omission than by commission).
170 JOHN BRADY, THE CRAFT OF INTERVIEWING 89-107 (1977).

171 See infra Part III.B.
172 In this particular context, building rapport may have involved the buyer
attempting to engage the seller in conversation about family and neighborhood ("Where
are you moving to?", "What activities did you enjoy while you lived in this
neighborhood?", "Can you tell me about some of the neighbors I would meet if I lived
here?", or "How old are your kids?").
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D. Demand the Use of Objective Standards-But Avoid Being
Hamstrung by Them
Asking questions such as, "What do you base that number on?" or "Is
that according to industry standard?" is essentially asking the other party to
justify their position using objective standards. People will be less likely to
attempt to lie and deceive if they know from the start of the negotiation that
objective criteria and standards will constantly be sought from other parties,
as well as outside sources. 173 The earlier art gallery example can shed
additional light on the use of objective criteria.' 74 The gallery owner justifies
his $2,750 offer for the painting through an astute use of objective standards:
he references the OfficialArt Auctions Book of the World (the comprehensive
book on art that is similar to the Kelley Blue Book on cars) which tells him
the auction price of twelve different paintings (of various sizes and
conditions) by the same artist, all sold in the last two years. The owner's
offer to the art student falls within the range of the auction prices listed (all of
which were between $2,000 and $3,000).
The lesson to be learned is that using objective criteria alone cannot
always prevent one from making a deal that is inferior to one that could be
made. In this scenario, objective criteria might provide an adequate floor for
the price of a painting, but one must ask (or discover through investigation) if
there are other factors that can raise the price above that floor. In other
words, what might be going on in this particular situation that would make
someone willing to pay more than the objective standard? Or, is there
someone who has a personal (or some other) connection to the painting that
makes it more valuable to him or her than the market would be willing to
pay? Or, is there something about this particular painting that somehow
differentiates it from the twelve that already sold on the market? In other
words, one must not be hamstrung by the power and credibility provided by
objective standards.

E. StrategicallyLimit Information Revelation
Before the negotiation, one should brainstorm and list specific questions
that will likely be asked by the other party. With enough preparation, many
(if not most) questions can be anticipated. One might practice aloud how
specific questions will be responded to and addressed, especially difficult and
173 Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. DisP. RESOL.
325, 373 (1996) (stating that "[a] negotiator should make a practice of asking the other

party to justify its positions in terms of some objective criteria.").
174 See infra Part II.B.
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controversial questions. Practicing aloud can make it easier to arrive at word
and phrase choices that will prevent or limit the revelation of strategic
information. Preparation should also include deciding upon which tactic to
employ in responding to questions about information that one does not wish
to disclose. For example, should one decide to ignore the question all
together? Or pretend to misconstrue the question and answer a less intrusive,
specific, or direct question? Or perhaps respond not with an answer at all, but
instead with a question of one's own? 175 In the art gallery example, the
gallery owner may have anticipated that he might be asked if there was
already a buyer in place for the painting he was acquiring from the art
student. The gallery owner's answer ("We purchase paintings from people
like you every single day and try to re-sell them as quickly as we possibly
can") was quite successful at evading the question 76 and thereby not
revealing the key piece of information that a wealthy buyer was waiting in
the wings to purchase the painting as soon as it could be located.
F. Recognize and Thwart Tactics of Evasion
The simplest way to get information is to ask for it, 177 yet it is sometimes
the most obvious (and crucial) questions that do not get asked (or answered)
during a negotiation. Prior to negotiating, one should write out a list of all the
questions he or she wants answered, in order of importance. During the
negotiation, one should listen carefully to the responses provided; many will
be mere attempts to evade answering the question. Evasion techniques are
abundant and varied (ignoring the question; offering to return to the question
later; answering only part of the question; answering a related but less
intrusive, specific, or direct question; calling the question unfair or
inappropriate and therefore not entitled to a response, etc.). 178 These or
similar evasion techniques will likely be employed throughout the
negotiation, and the most effective antidote is careful listening to determine
175 See CRAVER, supra note 15, at 95-98.

176 See infra Part Ill.B.
177 See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION

AND THE GENDER DIVIDE ix (2003) ("Women don't ask. They don't ask for raises and
promotions and better job opportunities. They don't ask for recognition for the good work
they do. They don't ask for more help at home ...women are much less likely than men
to use negotiation to get what they want.").
178 See CRAVER, supra note 15, at 95-98; see also Robert S. Adler, Negotiating With
Liars, 48 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 69, 71 (2007) ("As viewers who watch politicians and
public officials on Sunday morning interview shows can attest, there is a real art to
responding to questions by changing the subject or answering questions that have not
been asked.").
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if one's question is being addressed in full, in part, or not at all. One must
continue grilling until the information being sought is either revealed or
protected in a very direct manner. Thus, one might continue asking the same
question (along with reasonable follow-up questions to probe even deeper)
until the question (1) can be "checked off" as having been responded to in a
(reasonably) complete and forthcoming manner, or (2) is met by the other
party saying something to the effect of, "I simply cannot tell you that," or "I
179
cannot speak about that issue at all."'
G. Establish Long-Term Relationships and Watch for Signs of
Deception
If one were skilled at detecting liars upon meeting them, one could
simply walk away from the negotiation. Unfortunately, research indicates
that people are very poor at such immediate detection. This is true even
among the so-called "experts" (such as police investigators) who are more
confident, but not more accurate, in their determinations of who is lying and
who is not. 180 However, research suggests that if one can build a relationship
with a person over a longer period of time, then one has a much greater
ability to detect lies. Specifically, the research indicates that one of the more
reliable indicators of lying is when one's behavior suddenly changes: three
scholars conducting an extensive study of deceptive behavior suggest that
establishing a baseline in behavior before attempting to detect deception is
extremely important. 18 1 They conclude that "The most reliable indicator of
deception is likely to be a change from normal behavior within a particular

179 It is difficult, if not impossible, for one to know whether a question has been
answered in a complete and forthcoming manner. Answers given to follow-up questions
are key in helping to make such an assessment. It is important to remind oneself that
negotiation is a science, but also an art. See generally RAIFFA, supra note 32.
180 See Stemlight & Robbennolt, supra note 160, at 486-87 (discussing how people
widely believe that certain cues like averting one's gaze, engaging in lots of foot or hand
movements, or hesitating while speaking that are indicators of deception even though
evidence strongly suggests that (1) there is no particular cue (or set of cues) that can
reliably be used to identify a liar, and (2) people's performance levels in distinguishing
liars from truth-tellers are "little or no better than chance"); Saul M. Kassin, Human
Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident But Erroneous, 23 CARDOzO L.
REv. 809, 810 (2002); Saul M. Kassin et al., "I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw
One": A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 211,213 (2005).
181 Samantha Mann et al., Suspects, Lies, and Videotape: An Analysis of Authentic
High-Stake Liars, 26 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 365, 372-76 (2002).
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individual."' 182 For example, if a normally aggressive and boisterous
negotiator suddenly becomes more passive and soft spoken, it might be a
clue that he or she is engaging in deceptive behavior. This conclusion
underscores the importance of developing long-term relationships with
potential negotiation partners, where baseline behaviors can be established,
where changes in those normal behaviors can be observed, and where
83
possible deception can thereby be detected.1
H. Use "Come Clean " Questions Strategically
Used at critical moments in the negotiation (often toward the conclusion
of covering an important topic within the context of a larger negotiation), one
can ask the "come clean" question: "Is there something important known to
you, but not to me, that needs to be revealed at this point?"' 184 Negotiators on
the other side of the table might attempt to deflect the question or change the
topic, so one should be prepared to ask the question more than once (perhaps
with a new approach and different wording). One should pay close attention
to the response given to the question, perhaps even writing it down. 185 After
all, the response might later be used to support a claim of fraudulent nondisclosure if it is learned that valuable information was intentionally
withheld. Finally, one should be careful to observe body language when
asking the "come clean" question, as body language sometimes speaks louder
186
than words.
182 Id.at 372.
183 Many practicing attorneys will find that many, if not most, of their negotiations
will take place by phone. Detecting deception will likely be more difficult over the phone
because one cannot see changes in the other person's body language. See generally
ALBERT MEHRABIAN, SILENT MESSAGES (1971).

184 Adler & Silverstein, supra note 56, at 70.
185 One must be mindful, however, that note taking during a negotiation can
sometimes be interpreted by other parties as a sign of litigation preparation. Such an
interpretation can sometimes be avoided by a brief, disarming comment such as, "I hope
you don't mind that I take notes-it's just a habit I have to help me focus on the
conversation as we move along toward a deal."
186 See MEHRABIAN, supra note 183 (groundbreaking work conducted by Professor
Albert Mehrabian demonstrated that 55% of one's communicated message is conveyed
through posture, gestures, and facial expressions; 36% is through one's tone of voice; and
only 7% is through the words themselves); John W. Kennish, How to Read Body
Language: Non- Verbal Cues Can Turn Into Clues That Help Lead You to the Truth, 17
PA. LAW. 28 (1995); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Guiding Students To
Client-CenteredInterviewing Through Storytelling, 14 CLINICAL L. REv. 509, 525 (2008)
(discussing the role body language, including "mannerism, gesture, [and] tone," can play
in conveying information); see generally PAUL EKMAN, EMOTIoNs REVEALED:
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VIII. CONCLUSION
People lie in negotiations because doing so can sometimes help one close
a deal with terms that are highly favorable to one or one's client. In every
negotiation, no matter how much value-creation occurs to increase the size of
the negotiation "pie," there comes a point when that pie needs to be divided.
Simply put, lying can help one secure a larger share of the pie.
Moreover, information is the lifeblood of any negotiation, and at its core,
negotiation is about protecting sensitive information of one's own (to prevent
oneself from being exploited) while extracting information from other
parties. Good negotiators must therefore learn how to conduct extensive
background research, to engage aggressively and relentlessly in asking
questions and digging for answers, and to take other proactive steps to
unearth or extract the most (and most accurate) information possible from all
parties at the table. At the same time, they must be mindful of the
information they are disclosing and how other negotiation parties might use
that information in an exploitive manner.
A clear tension, then, develops between growing the largest possible pie
(which is done through sharing information, brainstorming ways to meet all
parties' underlying needs, and making trades) and trying to win the largest
share possible when the pie is finally divided (an outcome that can
sometimes be assisted through bluffing, puffing, and lying). In attempting to
manage this ever-present tension, the goal of negotiation becomes creating an
environment, designing a process, and implementing behaviors that allow
value creation to occur where possible, while simultaneously being aware of
(and thereby minimizing) risks of exploitation.
The rules and ethics requirements surrounding truthfulness in negotiation
(such as Model Rule 4.1, the duty of disclosure, and, to the limited extent
they exist in negotiation, good faith requirements) are far from crystal clear
and appear to yield different interpretations and results depending on the
circumstances of the negotiation and the person doing the interpreting. Two
separate surveys (one from twenty years ago and one quite recent) suggest
continuing disagreement and confusion among attorneys attempting to apply
the various lawyer ethics rules to various negotiation scenarios. Moreover,
even in the more straightforward cases, enforcement issues can present large
hurdles because most negotiations take place in private settings rather than in
open court.

RECOGNIZING FACES AND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL LIFE

(2003).
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In the past, many scholars have suggested that the optimal solution to
ensure fairness and integrity in negotiation is to raise the ethical bar-to
strengthen the duty of candor as currently set forth in rules of professional
conduct for lawyers. However, given a continuum of possible reform
approaches, I suggest that the more absolutist the approach taken (the closer
the reformed rules come to mandating "No lying about anything, period"),
the more impossible it becomes to enforce those new rules. This is because
the issues at the core of any negotiation (interests, priorities, value estimates,
and claim settlement intentions) reside within the minds of the negotiators
and their clients. Since these core issues are quite malleable and continuously
change and evolve as the negotiation winds its way from beginning to end,
proving a violation would require something close to mind-reading ability.
For this reason, I argue that raising the ethical bar for lawyer-negotiators
18 7
would likely fail.
Rather than focus on rules, my solution is to assume that lying might
occur in a given negotiation, and to provide people with the defensive
mindsets, strategies and techniques that will allow them to minimize the risk
of their being exploited. People so informed will be able to better understand,
interact with, and protect themselves from others who would try to gain
unfair advantage through lies and deception. Although it might be impossible
to prevent lying in the context of negotiation, 8 8 it is my hope that the
prescriptive advice set forth in this article will prove useful in warding off
exploitation of both oneself and one's clients.

187 Not to mention the fact that, in those instances where people hire someone to

negotiate on their behalf, raising the bar might lead to a preference for hiring non-lawyer
negotiators who are not bound by strict and potentially cumbersome ethics rules.
188 See Arthur Allen Left, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J.

1229, 1249 (1979):
All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what we know
about ourselves, and each other, this is an extraordinarily unappetizing prospect;
looking around the world, it appears that if all men are brothers, the ruling model is
Cain and Abel. Neither reason, nor love, nor even terror, seems to have worked to
make us 'good,' and worse than that, there is no reason why anything should.
Id.
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